Kursk Offensive – Full Documentary
It’s August 6th, 2024. Two Russian Ka-52
helicopters are scrambled to repel the Ukrainian cross-border operation of unknown scale. Helicopters quickly locate and
destroy two tanks, which were still on tank transporters
near the city of Sudzha. Satisfied with the outcome of their strike,
the crews veer off into the horizon, unaware that they had just obliterated
the only Russian armor sent to halt the Ukrainian incursion into Kursk in its tracks. Whenever it comes to discussing the Kursk
offensive, most accounts begin with how exactly Ukrainian forces crossed the border on August
6th, 2024. As much as we want to get to that, we must first turn to an operation almost
no one has heard of—codenamed “Seneka.” Operation Seneka began on July 27th, 2024, with
a single objective: to prevent Russian forces from discovering when and where Ukraine
would launch its next major offensive. At least four Ukrainian Psychological and
Information Warfare Centers, reporting directly to the unified Special Operations Command
under Brigadier General Oleksandr Trepak, began meticulously simulating heightened military
activity in the Kharkiv region, where Russia had launched its own offensive back in May 2024.
Ukrainian operatives used mobile speaker systems to broadcast the sounds of
heavy equipment movements at night, transmitted false information over unprotected
mobile networks, and deployed radio emitters to mimic various military signals. They also
scattered decoy equipment across the landscape. To conceal the actual redeployment of the 80th Air
Assault Brigade to the border—an operation that, if detected, could have alerted the Russians to
the imminent offensive—a narrative was introduced claiming that the 88th Mechanized Brigade had
already been training there for months. This unit, like the 13th Jaeger Brigade, never existed.
Ukrainian forces had simply simulated their activity on the border for months to obscure
the timing and scale of the real buildup. The deception was so effective that
the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, dismissed all intelligence
reports warning of a possible Ukrainian advance from the Sumy region and instead
redirected his attention towards Kharkiv. All these efforts, carried out under
the first phase of Operation Seneka, secured for Ukrainian forces the element of
surprise, without which none of what followed on August 6th would have been possible.
The same can be said about the author of the operation. In 2024, Oleksandr Syrskiy—known
as the man behind Ukraine’s lightning offensive in the Kharkiv region in 2022 and defense
of Kyiv—replaced Valeriy Zaluzhnyi as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of Ukraine. One of the reasons for that was clearly the unsuccessful 2023 Southern
Counteroffensive, which we covered together with all the other abovementioned operations
in our previous videos. Syrskiy stepped into the role when the brutal battles grinding on in
the Donbas didn’t just continue—they escalated. Despite suffering staggering losses, the adversary
pushed forward, treeline by treeline, after one of the last pre-2022 strongholds, Avdiivka,
was lost. With Pokrovsk now under threat, Russian troops weren’t just tearing through
Ukrainian defensive lines—they were also significantly eroding morale. In May 2024,
they even opened the new mini-frontline, starting an ultimately unsuccessful offensive in
the Kharkiv region, which yet further reinforced the widely accepted idea that Ukraine, unlike
Russia, is unable to take back initiative and advance. Syrskiy’s first and foremost goal
was to prove everyone wrong in this regard. He began preparations for a new advance in March
2024 by analyzing what had gone wrong with the previous summer offensive. Undeniably, the biggest
issue was the location of the attack—likely the most heavily reinforced sector of the frontline,
in the Zaporizhzhia region. For the new operation, Syrskyi ultimately concluded that the static
nature of the frontline in Ukraine allowed only limited gains at high cost. Therefore, the
strike would need to be aimed directly at Russian territory. Second, operational security must
be at the highest level, meaning that everyone, from most of Ukraine’s General Staff to all
of Ukraine’s allies, should remain completely unaware of the operation’s existence or any of
its details. Third, the execution of such a risky plan can only be entrusted to the most experienced
and mobile Ukrainian units, which will receive the best drone, air defense, and aviation support.
Therefore, Syrskiy forms the spearhead of the attack out of the 80th, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault
Brigades, which are secretly redeployed to the Sumy region for the initial breakthrough. These
are reinforced by the 33rd and 225th Assault Battalions—Syrskiy’s experimental units designed
for aggressive attacks—as well as the more conventional 22nd, 61st, and 116th Mechanized
Brigades, two reconnaissance and one artillery battalion, the 8th Special Operations Regiment,
the 5th Omega Special Operations Detachment, SBU Alpha group, two newly formed Special Purpose
Regiments of “Rangers,” along with a few extra battalions and TDF brigades. Altogether, this
brings the total force to somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 men, as many units mentioned are not
deployed in full force due to continuing combat in other parts of the country. Drone support is
provided by the 14th UAV Regiment, Flying Skull, Project M2, Requiem Group, and Khorne group
UAV units. In June, the Ukrainians also formed the 49th Separate Assault Engineering Brigade
specifically for breaching heavy fortifications along with the already existing 48th Engineering
Brigade and 808th Support Brigade, again keeping in mind the previous offensive, which was
stalled by minefields and other defenses. Despite the fact that the border between Ukraine’s
Sumy region and Russia’s Kursk region is chosen due to its relatively light fortifications,
crossing it is by no means easy. The Russians have thoroughly mined it, set up multiple
observation checkpoints, dug anti-tank ditches, laid lines of dragon’s teeth, and established
regular drone patrols and camera posts. Between 5 and 15 kilometers from the border lies the main
Russian defensive line, protecting the sizable city of Sudzha, the administrative center
of Sudzhansky District. More importantly, however, is the question of who is defending it.
Around Sudzha, the Russians have concentrated the 380th and 488th Regiments, each fielding two
battalions, mostly deployed across the main rear defenses, alongside local OMON units—a special
police branch of the National Guard of Russia. Closer to the border, alongside border guards and
conscripts, is the 1434th Motor Rifle Regiment “Akhmat.” To the south, the same regiment also
holds large parts of the border, supported by the 13th Tank Regiment, FSB Special Operations
Center operatives, and the same border guard and conscript formations. Another unusual unit thinly
spread across the area is the so-called VKS Motor Rifle Regiment, composed of personnel from the
Russian Aerospace Forces. Various engineers, mechanics, and flying staff who are now used as
assault infantry due to a shortage of manpower. To sum things up, Alexander Syrskyi, just as
he did in 2022, has identified a stretch of the frontline defended by relatively few adversary
units—and, notably, commanded by the notorious Alexander Lapin. Despite this, Russian advantages
remain in place in the form of landmines, fortifications, air power, and artillery,
including elements of the 236th Artillery Brigade and the 275th Self-Propelled Artillery
Regiment. Though stretched thin across the region, these units still field 13 MLRS systems, 98
artillery pieces, and 71 mortars. On top of that are FPV drone crews, now operating brand
new fiber-optic drones immune to signal jamming or interference from obstacles.
So, the Ukrainians are under no illusion that the operation will be easy.
Yet after Syrskyi personally visits most of the units and explains how different their
mission will be from all previous operations, the soldiers are determined to bring the war back
to Russia—by punching through its weakest spot. The first ones to cross the border at the
beginning of August are Special Operations forces. They infiltrate covertly and demine narrow
pathways as well as do the final assessment of the Russian fortification and patrols. This
information is crucial for further attacks. On August 3rd, three days before the incursion,
elements of the 80th Air Assault Brigade covertly infiltrate the border up to 500 meters deep. The
soldiers cross it in groups of 6 to 8 people with 2 special operations operatives leading each group
through already demined pathways, in this way, covertly concentrating up to 70 soldiers behind
enemy lines for sabotage and reconnaissance. On August 6th, the main operation begins in the
early morning. Ukrainians launch coordinated drone and artillery strikes, while the armor
of the 80th Air Assault Brigade with a new triangular tactical symbol, rapidly breaches the
Sudzha border checkpoint. Under relentless tank and artillery fire, the entire Russian garrison at
the checkpoint surrenders. Photos soon emerge of a full Russian platoon walking toward the Ukrainian
border with raised hands—the first visible sign that something significant is underway.
However, Ukrainian forces strictly adhere to orders limiting the release of footage, so apart
from Ukrainian high command and Russian troops under direct attack, few realize that a major new
offensive has begun. This is not a coincidence, but a second phase of operation “Seneka” as
Ukrainian Psychological and Information Warfare Centers carefully highlight Russian missteps, but
leave a lot of room for confusion and speculation by controlling what footage is released. They
also place emphasis on the huge number of conscripts that are captured, immediately forcing
Russia to ask for renewal of prisoner swaps, as well as destroying the reputation of the praised
Chechen fighters. Major General Apti Alaudinov, commander of the various Chechen Akhmat formations
in the area, quite literally plays along—publicly claiming the border remains secure while quietly
withdrawing his forces to the second defensive line. These actions further ruin the cohesion of
defenses and result in even more losses. East of Nikolaevo-Darino, Ukrainian engineering units,
equipped with UR-77s, American M58 MICLICs, Wisent 1 MCs, and Biber bridge layers from the
48th, 49th Engineering and 808th Support Brigades, actively carve paths through the Russian defenses.
The armor of the 225th Assault Battalion is the first to push through these breaches. They are
immediately followed by the mobile Stryker APCs and MRAPs of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade and the
22nd Mechanized Brigade. While the 82nd spearheads toward Zelenyi Shlyakh, the 22nd and the 225th
systematically clear Russian positions in and around Nikolaevo-Darino and Darino. Using
forest cover to their advantage, Ukrainian tanks eliminate enemy dugouts while infantry are
dropped by HMMWVs behind Russian fortifications, taking prisoners in the process. Simultaneously,
Ukrainian forces begin breaching the border near Gordeevka and south of Oleshnya, forcing the
adversary to stretch its forces even further. The Russian response, while quick, is disorganized.
Russian FPVs and Lancets focus on the immediate incursion zone, unaware that Ukrainian forces
are already advancing deep into Russian territory with minimal resistance. The Kremlin downplays the
situation too, describing the offensive as a minor sabotage operation that was already “contained,”
further adding to the confusion. As border troops surrender or flee, among them a significant
portion of the supposedly elite 1434th Motor Rifle Regiment “Akhmat”, Russian aviation is the
first to meaningfully engage. However, as during the Kharkiv counteroffensive, Ukrainian advances
are so rapid that it is impossible to properly target the airstrikes. As a result, Russian attack
aircraft drop munitions indiscriminately, dealing minimal damage to Ukrainian troops. Helicopters
like the Ka-52s and Mi-28s are supposed to be more effective in these circumstances, but they also
fail to land effective hits. In a landmark moment, one Mi-28N is shot down by a Ukrainian FPV drone,
marking the first recorded instance of this type of engagement in this war. In a more conventional
manner, using MANPADS, Ukrainians also shoot down one Ka-52 helicopter. Ironically, the only
confirmed “achievement” of Russian army aviation on August 6th is the destruction of two of its
own T-80BVM tanks, highlighted in the beginning of this video. With their defenses visibly collapsing
and panic spreading, the Russian command turns to last-resort measures. Iskander ballistic
missiles are fired in a desperate attempt to hit Ukrainian columns. One strike near Zelenyi Shlyakh
manages to target a column, causing some damage, which yet hardly stops the advance. Another
strike using two more missiles destroys a single Buk SAM system near the border. These
disproportionately expensive and poorly targeted attacks—firing $9 million worth of ballistic
missiles at individual vehicles—underscore the Russian leadership’s desire to maintain
the illusion of control, rather than mount an effective response to the unfolding breakthrough.
On August 7th, the 82nd Air Assault Brigade has already crossed the main Russian defensive line,
wreaking havoc behind enemy lines. The 225th Assault Battalion catches up with it, while its
positions are taken over by forces of the 103rd Territorial Defense Brigade with support from the
Georgian Legion. Elements of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade are swiftly redeployed to the eastern
flank of the breakthrough. At the same time, the 80th Air Assault Brigade pushes towards
Sudzha. Ukrainian forces also cross the border south of Oleshnya with the elements of the 116th
Mechanized Brigade, encircling the village. Here, the breakthrough is not easy, and Ukrainians
take some losses, but eventually, pathways for vehicles are demined and cleared. Similar to the
82nd, the 80th Air Assault Brigade surges forward, smashing through the Russian main line of defense
and entering Sudzha from the west. Its advance is well-coordinated with the other two brigades to
the north and south, allowing Ukrainian forces to approach the key city from three directions. While
the 22nd Mechanized Brigade ties down Russians in Kazachya Loknya, the 116th advances through
fields and approaches Sudzha from the south. The Russian city garrison, completely disorganized
and under relentless attacks from multiple sides, retreats in disarray to the eastern part
of the city. Meanwhile, the 82nd Brigade, advancing near Novoivanovka, splits its forces
and pushes both to the east and west. Near Malaya Loknya, they continue to catch Russians
by surprise and destroy them, but the attack on Korenevo is thwarted. This is due to Russian
reinforcements, an additional battalion of a VKS motor rifle regiment redeployed just in time to
repel the determined but not numerous Ukrainian assault. Despite that, Ukrainian forces in many
places reach the road between Sudzha and Korenevo, effectively joining multiple breakthroughs
into a single salient. Russians continue wasting Iskander ballistic missiles trying
to hit the advancing columns, but achieve only misses after misses. Lancet drones are much
more successful in hitting Ukrainian vehicles, but they are mostly used near the border and
not at the spearheads of the Ukrainian attack, indicating that the Russians still lack
situational awareness. Another sign of this is the Chief of the General Staff of Russia, Valeriy
Gerasimov, reporting to Putin and the public that the Ukrainian advance has been completely
stopped. This statement is not going to age well. On August 8th, the 22nd Mechanized Brigade crosses
the river north of Sudzha and catches up with previously routed elements of the 488th Motor
Rifle Regiment, forcing them to retreat back to the eastern part of the city. Now in control
of the main supply line to Sudzha, Ukrainian forces capture most of the city by the third day
of the offensive, with only a small contingent of defenders encircled behind the river. The
Ukrainian plan to swiftly cut through the Russian defensive line and seize the main part of Sudzha
worked perfectly. But the key question now is: what’s next? Apparently, Syrskiy understands that
the forces under his command are not just fighting the Russians—they’re racing against time. The
enemy will inevitably raise its situational awareness and bring numerous reinforcements,
which will soon curb the lightning-fast Ukrainian advance. Before that happens, Ukrainians must
secure as many favorable positions as possible. Anchoring their defense on two major cities,
Sudzha and Korenevo, both situated next to rivers that serve as natural defensive barriers,
appears to be the next logical goal. Accordingly, the 103rd Territorial Defense Brigade and the
Georgian Legion begin their advance westward, reaching Snagost. A portion of the 82nd
Air Assault Brigade initiates a second assault on Korenevo. Although they manage
to gain a foothold on the city’s outskirts, the advance halts due to the size of the urban
area and the arrival of reinforcements. Here, Ukrainians simply lack the manpower to replicate
the skillful encirclement seen in western Sudzha, and as a result, Korenevo remains under Russian
control. Meanwhile, another element of the 82nd Brigade advances east of Korenevo, reaching as far
as Kromskie Byky. Following the fall of western Sudzha, the 80th Air Assault Brigade, supported
by auxiliary units, advances along the main road, reaching as far as Bolshoe Soldatskoe. There, they
encounter Russian reinforcements and are forced to regroup to Martynovka after intense combat.
Despite this first sharp check, Russians are still unable to effectively blunt Ukrainian mechanized
assaults with their own armor. Most footage of arriving reinforcements shows more “Loaf” vans
than tanks or BMPs. One of the first—if not the very first—Russian units redeployed to Kursk
from Donbas is the ex-DPR 15th “Pyatnashka” Brigade. However, this rapid redeployment
is marked by the usual Russian recklessness, leading to catastrophic losses. During the night
between August 8th and 9th, drones of the Khorne Group spot a Russian convoy near Rylsk, and
Ukrainian forces immediately strike it with HIMARS. As a result, eight trucks full of Russian
soldiers are destroyed before even reaching the frontline. By some accounts, the losses
constitute at least one whole battalion of troops. On August 9th, a significant number of armored
vehicles, currently in rather short supply, arrive to Bolshoe Soldatskoe and Belitsya. Exactly from
Belitsya, Russians launch their first full-fledged counterattack. The road leading toward Sudzha
had previously been remotely mined by Ukrainian drones, but the charges were set to activate
after 48 hours, meaning that by August 9th, they had effectively expired, reopening the route.
An additional attack on Martynovka is easily repelled by Ukrainian paratroopers. However, while
they are engaged there, the ern flank begins to falter as Russian columns enter Goncharovka and
nearly succeed in deblocking the Sudzha garrison. This success proves short-lived: Ukrainian forces
quickly redeploy elements of the 61st Mechanized Brigade to the area, retake Goncharovka, and rout
the Russian attackers. The road is mined again to prevent further breakthroughs, and a significant
portion of the 61st Brigade remains in place to secure this flank of Sudzha. Meanwhile, Ukrainian
assaults on Korenevo fail to achieve results. Russian forces continue to hold the central part
of the city along with key bridges, preventing any easy encirclement. Overall, the battles in
the Kursk region show that Ukrainian forces have succeeded in establishing solid positions in
most of the areas they infiltrated. However, Russian forces are also clearly stepping
up their efforts, eager to mitigate the humiliation of being invaded after two and a
half years of attempting to conquer Ukraine. On August 10th, Russia redeploys the 810th
Marine Brigade from Donbas in full force to the southeastern part of the salient. However,
instead of trying to cut Ukrainian forces off from the border, they now concentrate on pushing
them back in the area of Martynovka. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are conducting assaults on Kruglik. The
clashes in both villages are brutal, though the Russians are using fewer vehicles in an attempt to
avoid losing their limited and valuable equipment. Fierce fighting also erupts around Plekhovo, where
Ukrainian have quickly secured the western bank of the Psel River and are now working to ensure that
a repeat of yesterday’s flank attack on Sudzha does not occur. The assaults here are supported
by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces which face Russian colleagues, in particular from elite
Senezh Special Forces Center. The situation around Korenevo remains largely unchanged, despite
reinforcements arriving from a fraction of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade. The rest of that
brigade continues to defend Martynovka, while the fresh forces of the 95th Air Assault Brigade
are deployed to the area of Malaya Loknya and Pogrebki. Ukraianin paratroopers clash with 9th
Regiment of 18th Motor Rifle Division which is half-encircled in town since the beginning of
incursion and is eventually almost completely wiped out. There, they also manage to shoot
down a Russian Ka-52 helicopter using MANPADS. Overall, the effectiveness of Russian
aviation and helicopters remains low, even after the frontline has begun to stabilize.
There is almost no evidence of successful strikes except for the following case. In this
footage, we can see how the Russian Ka-52 uses two laser-beam-riding anti-tank Vikhr missiles to
accurately take out two trucks on the road. This is an impressive result and a great demonstration
of the modern attack helicopter capabilities. The only problem is that these two trucks
were taken out earlier by the drones of the 225th Assault Regiment and abandoned.
And yes, these two belonged to Russians, who hastily retreated to Korenevo in the first
two days of the Kursk offensive. In contrast, multiple videos show Ukrainians successfully
evacuating damaged equipment, signaling that their logistics are holding firm despite the drone-heavy
battlefield. This is no accident. Nearby, the newly expanded 170th Logistics Regiment, formerly
a battalion and now a key part of the Air Assault Corps, is actively supporting the operation.
On August 11th, the focus remains on Martynovka, where Russian marines relentlessly
attack positions held by the 22nd Mechanized Brigade. The village changes
hands multiple times throughout the day, with Ukrainians ultimately prevailing, despite
coming close to being cut off in nearby Kruglik. Multiple sources also report that Ukrainian
forces cross the border near Goptarevka. However, given the complete absence of photographic
or video evidence of such a breakthrough, this too was likely a psychological operation
intended to divert Russian attention. Meanwhile, Ukrainians attempt to encircle Korenevo with a
flanking maneuver by mobile units of the 82nd Air Assault Brigade. This, however, brings little
improvement to the situation, as Russian forces continue to hold key ground in the city. The
VKS motor Rifle regiment here is reinforced by the elements of 810th Marine and 128th Motor Rifle
Brigades. Russian attempts to strike the Ukrainian salient from the north, in the direction of Malaya
Loknya with combined forces of 11th Air Assault and 810th Marine Brigades, are inconclusive.
This is likely due to at least a fraction of 80th Air Assault Brigade being redeployed here
from the area of Sudzha some time before this moment, which in turn allowed to free up elements
of 82nd Air assault for attacks north of Korenevo. On August 12th, Ukrainians finally break
the resistance of the 810th Marine Brigade in Martynovka, routing them and capturing
Mykhailovka. They continue advancing along the key road from Sudzha, now facing the 217th Air
Assault Regiment. However, more significant events unfold further south. Elements of the Ukrainian
92nd Assault Brigade are deployed here to make a breakthrough on BTR-4s, pushing straight toward
Giri. The plan appears to have been a surprise attack on Russian reinforcements gathering in
Belitsa. Even though this column of at least six BTR-4s initially went unnoticed while traveling
20 kilometers, Russian drone operators eventually spot them near Giri. There, BTRs are ambushed
by Akhmat Special Forces and make a decision to regroup and set up an ambush themselves. Judging
by the attempt to hide BTRs in Giri’s forest, the plan was to attack Russian forces when they
are scrambled to mitigate a breakthrough. However, once spotted, this Ukrainian armored platoon faces
a brand-new Russian weapon: fiber-optic FPVs. Developed shortly before the Kursk Incursion,
these drones, unlike regular FPVs, cannot be jammed and offer far superior image resolution.
A swarm of these FPVs attacks the BTR-4s, destroying four vehicles with precise strikes on
vulnerable spots. This occurs simultaneously with BTRs engaging Russian reinforcements rushing to
the village. One additional BTR-4 is destroyed by the autocannon of a Russian BTR-82, and another is
captured intact, bringing total losses to six. For Ukraine, this represents one of the largest
one-time vehicle losses in this operation. Thanks to the armor, most occupants survived,
but the Giri assault marks a turning point: it becomes clear that fiber-optic FPVs are a
formidable advancement, and they will play a significant role in how events will unfold on this
frontline in the future. On the western flank of the salient, elements of the Russian 810th Marine
Brigade are now seen in Kremyanoe, significantly reducing Ukraine’s chances of enveloping Korenevo.
Instead, focus likely shifts to Snagost, south of the major city. The Ukrainian HIMARS systems
also begin targeting the bridge in Glushkovo, since collapsing it will significantly degrade
logistics for the Russians here. Besides bridges, GMLRS rockets are also used for counter-battery
fire and destroying command posts, significantly reducing Russian capabilities to counterattack.
Russian Ka-52s also contribute to that, striking two friendly Msta-S howitzers 15 km from
the actual frontline, once again signaling low level of situational awareness among Russians.
After the first week of Offensive has passed, we can draw the first conclusions and infer
what is the goal of the operation. First of all, Ukraine has managed to capture around 1,000 square
kilometers of land and 74 settlements inside the Kursk Region in one week. This far surpasses
not only modest Russian gains in the new Kharkiv offensive in the last three months, but also
months worth of Russian gains in Donbas. What Ukraine demonstrated is nearly perfect blitzkrieg,
deemed impossible in the drone era. All is due to careful analysis of past mistakes, new approaches
to operational secrecy, logistics, demining, as well as the careful choice of the place of
advance. Ukraine has also managed to capture hundreds of prisoners of war, with estimates
reaching as far as 800 men. These include around 250 conscripts that are not supposed to
participate in active combat, as well as Chechens, who, you guessed it, are also not supposed to
participate in active combat, so these categories are extremely valuable for the future prisoner
exchanges. Many speculate that the purpose of the operation was to capture Kursk Nuclear Power
Plant, the city of Kursk, or at least reach Rylsk. The first hypothesis is even supported by the
Russian Ministry of Defense, which officially claims that Ukrainians planned to blow up the
power plant after capture. The credibility of this statement, however, is undermined not only by the
reputation of the Russian Ministry of Defense but even by the fact that on the map they made, half
of the Ukrainian units are placed in the wrong places. Even a non-existent 88th Mechanized
Brigade that in reality was the 80th Air Assault is present. It is true that we do not know the
real goals of the Ukrainian command, but claims about plans to capture specifically Kursk, Kursk
Nuclear Power Plant, or Rylsk are not supported by any evidence at all. Judging by modest forces
involved and multiple multilateral attacks, we infer that the plan was to capture as much
Russian land as possible, take a foothold in some solid strongpoints, such as Sudzha and Korenevo as
well as on local highgrounds, and force Russians to pull forces from Donbas to fight an uphill
battle on their own land. Among additional benefits of the offensive, there is a significant
morale boost, further escalation that should speed up approval of strikes on Russian land by western
long-range weapons, as well as prisoners of war that can be exchanged. Other speculations look
more like intentionally setting an unachievable, in current circumstances, goal for the offensive
to declare its failure as fast as possible. Coming back to the battlefield, on August
13th, Ukrainians continue attempts to cross the Krepna river near Korenevo, but apparently,
these attacks are curbed by the abundance of drones. Korenevo is also reinforced with
elements of the 98th Air Assault Division, which was stationed nearby before the incursion,
including the drone unit Bobr. Across the salient, Russians capture a few Ukrainian damaged vehicles,
which indicates that these were abandoned, likely in an attempt to consolidate positions.
Both Russian and Ukrainian aviation continue to conduct airstrikes while both sides try to fortify
the new frontline. Colonel-General Alexei Dyumin is appointed as the head of the Russian operations
in the Kursk region. Being Putin’s assistant, he never participated in any major military
matters, usually serving in administrative roles, which rather shows that Lapin will continue
his destructive command, while Dumin will just serve as a conduit of information to Putin.
On August 14th, 14 operatives from Ukraine’s SBU Alpha Group captured another 100 Russian
soldiers, mainly from the 488th Regiment and the 204th Spetsnaz Regiment “Akhmat”, inside a
network of fortifications in Gordeevka. Meanwhile, elements of these same unit fled or surrendered en
masse in the encircled eastern sector of Sudzha. With this, it is now clear that Ukrainian
forces have secured full control of the city. These repeated surrenders show that, despite
deploying various reinforcements to the region, Russian forces lack effective coordination with
the isolated garrisons left behind as Ukraine advanced. Hidden in elaborate fortifications,
both elite and regular Russian troops have been effectively cut off and abandoned. Ukrainian
troops typically give them a chance to surrender, if they refuse, a few grenades finish the job.
The soldiers of the Ukrainian column of BTR-4s that was destroyed in Giri were not routed and
took a foothold in Kamyshnoe, where they engage in brutal combat with Russians. Some gains are also
made around Sudzha, which further allows the city to turn into the anchor of defense and logistical
hub, despite the arrival here of the 15th and 200th Motor Rifle brigades. The advance also
counties to the south of Snagost. Ukrainians again target Russian logistics by seriously damaging
the bridge in Glushkovo with HIMARS rockets. The still present degree of confusion about who
holds what positions allows Ukrainian Special Operations forces to continue acting in the
intended manner. They actively infiltrate Russian lines and make ambushes, increasing adversary
losses despite frontline stabilization. Of course, it is only relatively stable, but still does not
look like one in Donbas, where industrial cities and fortifications force things to resemble
WW1. In Kursk, Ukrainians, just like Russians, still make raids, using a less urbanized
environment and forests for maneuvers. However, these become progressively more and more risky,
which is illustrated by both Russian and Ukrainian ambushes on each other’s vehicles. This also
means that any maps, including our one, can hardly reflect to the fullest extent the real
state of combat. Thus, it should be viewed with a pinch of salt as it reflects only the area
Ukrainians control with the highest probability and does not show each and every raid and
contested territory for obvious reasons. On August 16th, all eyes continue to be on the
western part of the salient. Here, the Seym river works as a solid defensive line, but also creates
a few bottlenecks in logistics. For this reason, Russians start retreating from the western
part of Tetkino, blowing up the bridge, however, this is not enough. Ukrainian Aviation
conducts a precise airstrike with guided bombs on a damaged bridge near Glushkovo, finally
collapsing it. The Russians quickly start establishing a pontoon bridge to the east of the
destroyed one. Ukrainians, meanwhile, conduct an airstrike on a bridge in Zvannoe, heavily damaging
it. Overall, Ukrainian aviation starts conducting more airstrikes on Russian territory with guided
munitions such as French Hammer bombs, American GBU-39s, and JDAMs that are more effective
against bridges than GMLRS HIMARS rockets. On August 17th, Russians continue to use
Iskander ballistic missiles, targeting HIMARS and M270 MLRS long range systems. While
one HIMARS was indeed taken out in Sumy region, judging by the secondary detonation of munitions
filmed by drone, in the second strike, Russians actually destroyed an inflatable decoy instead
of the real vehicle. The concentration of many such decoys near Kharkiv already helped to divert
Russian attention prior to the Kursk incursion, and now, the placement of them all across the
Sumy region quite effectively wastes Russian high-precision weapons. This, however, does not
mean Ukrainians suffer no losses due to Russian strikes. The drones put strain on logistics
and also curb many Ukrainian tactical attacks, resulting in the extremely rare situation where
Ukraine ends up losing more equipment than the adversary. From the Russian side, mostly infantry
assaults continue across the whole frontline, especially in the area of Mala Loknya. There,
the 95th Air Assault Brigade consistently repels Russian attacks and regularly counterattacks.
On August 18th, Russian forces on the southern bank of the Seym river apparently start feeling
the pressure of closing Ukrainian troops, who capture Snagost. They first and
foremost prioritize the immediate evacuation of phones and other possessions
of value from Glushkovo stores. Apparently, to prevent a possible capture by the enemy. Jokes
aside, the acts of pillaging by Russian forces in the Kursk region are not different from those seen
in Ukraine, so we will mention them just once. The same is true for a long list of war crimes,
which will become progressively more common in a few months and will mostly manifest themselves
in executions of Ukrainian prisoners of war, especially by Russian marines. Some elements of
them in the form of the fraction of 155th Marine Brigade are redeployed here as well.
Meanwhile, the Ukrainian command too, carefully continues to deploy scarce reserves to
gain just a little bit more land. Here, the 501st Separate Marine Battalion captures Apanasovka,
further creating pressure on the Russian forces on the southern bank of the Seym River.
On August 19th, the third and last bridge across the Seym river is heavily damaged by Ukrainian
aviation. In addition to that, with marines now supporting the advance, the area of control
is expanded into Vishnevka. This way, the area south of the Seym river is further isolated and
is supplied only with pontoon bridges. Moreover, these still act as logistical bottlenecks,
which allow Ukrainians to quite effectively catch multiple pieces of Russian equipment
there and destroy them with FPV drones and GMLRS rockets. Ukrainian airstrikes reach not only
river crossings, but also Russian command posts in the eastern part of Tetkino and Glushkovo.
On August 20th, Ukrainians reach the Seym river by capturing Krasnooktyabrskoe and consolidate their
positions to the south. Near Korenevo, Ukrainians still firmly hold the outer perimeter of the city,
but are likely expecting counterattacks by the garrison. This is why they start thoroughly mining
the streets with drones, and this has a certain effect. In a video published by Russians, two
vehicles in a column are destroyed by something that is claimed to be a new, precise Russian bomb
capable of tracking moving targets. The other video, however, shows that one of the vehicles
is a loaf van in a Russian-controlled area, so the column was in fact not Ukrainian and simply
hit the landmines planted by Ukrainian drones. To the west, Ukrainians continue
airstrikes on Russian pontoons near the heavily damaged bridge in Zvannoe. Even
the redeployment of the elements of the 5th Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade here does not help.
It is also a good time to revisit the northern and eastern parts of the salient. There, through a
week of active combat, Ukrainians have managed to secure quite a few positions, now not just
contesting, but controlling a significant salient towards Kauchuk and engaging in heavy combat
inside the village itself. A few active advances towards Nechaev also create tough conditions
for elements of the 810th Marine Brigade, who, quite successfully, tied Ukrainians in combat
in Malaya Loknya but are now close to being encircled. The frontline to the east of Sudzha
continues to resemble a stable arc from Martynovka to Borki. Russians conducted multiple assaults on
Martynovka, but Ukrainians have managed to repel them all and even counterattack, entering Russkaya
Konopelka. The heavy combat there is apparently confusing, not only for spectators, but also for
the participants. In the town engulfed in flames, Ukrainian forces clash with Russian paratroopers
of the 11th Air Assault Brigade and other auxiliary forces in brutal urban combat. Ukrainian
Kozak MRAPs and an M113 APC are seen delivering infantry that takes a foothold in the town.
Suddenly, the Russian BMP-3 appears out of the smoke and splits Ukrainian forces. It first
tries to destroy the M113 that hastily retreats, but misses every shot. After that, the Russian
BMP-3 turns around to take out the Ukrainian Kozak-7 MRAP, that similar to the M113, simply
has no weapons capable of penetrating a Russian vehicle. However, the Russian BMP-1, which also
suddenly appears on the intersection, also tries to destroy the Ukrainian MRAP, approaching
it from the left side. The driver of the MRAP starts quickly reversing as it has nothing else
to do. Suddenly, the Russian BMP-3 opens fire at the MRAP, despite the friendly BMP-1 blocking
the sight, tearing the friendly vehicle apart. Looking at how violently BMP-3 destroys that
BMP-1, it seems like it was misidentified by the crew as an enemy since the BMP-1 appeared
from nowhere and stayed perpendicular to BMP-3, without showing the big V symbol in front. The
unexpected combat between two Russian BMPs allows the Ukrainian MRAP to escape for now, and its
crew is dropped off at nearby houses. The vehicle itself is later destroyed by drones, same as 2
other Kozak-7 MRAPs that entered the town, but infantry was successfully delivered to positions,
with Ukrainians losing only one man killed and one wounded according to the footage. This
engagement highlights how chaotic urban combat, especially involving multiple vehicles, can be.
Moreover, since drones are the primary weapon used to destroy any equipment, the engagement described
above can indicate that crews are simply losing skills associated with vehicle-to-vehicle battles.
At this point, there are quite literally thousands of drone strikes for every pure vehicle duel.
By August 21st, to the south, Ukrainians also capture Kolmakov and Fanaseevka. Even near
Korenevo, they achieve important gains by taking back Kremyanoe. This is possible due to the 810th
Marine Brigade shifting its focus to Kauchuk, where their quite ambitious counterattack ends
in disaster. The marines are encircled and suffer heavy casualties. Overall, the Ukrainians
revitalize the offensive to some extent despite numerous Russian reinforcements, drones, and
aviation. Working in tight coordination with artillery units armed with HIMARS and M270 MLRS,
the Ukrainian 8th Special Operations Regiment locates the Russian river crossings around
Glushkovo. First, operatives employ FPV drones to take out exposed engineering equipment. Then,
the crossings are hit with regular GMLRS rockets that destroy the bridges. Finally, the cluster
GMLRS rockets are used to finish off infantry, completing the task of cutting off Russian
logistics again. Despite such textbook operations, Russians continue to build bridges right under
the strikes to persistently maintain at least some logistics across the river,
despite losing men and equipment. On August 22nd, Ukrainians capture Komarovka,
continuing pressure on Glushkovo. The way of Ukrainian troops here is consistently cleared
by aviation, which continues to target not only bridges, but major Russian fortifications and
strongpoints, such as one in Vtoraya Muzhitsya. Russians, meanwhile, push the adversary out
of Nechaev with forces of the newly arrived “Arbat” battalion and bring the 2nd Spetsnaz
Brigade to the eastern flank of the salient. Despite these reinforcements, it is fair to say
that both Russians and Ukrainians are running low on reserves to achieve new breakthroughs.
This, however, does not mean that forces are even somewhat equal, as the Russian Grouping of Forces
“North” numbers around 70 thousand men, which are split between the static and deprioritized
Kharkiv Frontline and Kursk Incursion Area. Even very rough estimates indicate that against
approximately 10 to 20 thousand Ukrainians, here, Russians concentrate somewhere
between 30 and 50 thousand of their, by far, not the worst troops. Surprisingly,
in terms of equipment, which Ukrainians were losing quite actively due to drones and need to
advance, there is certain parity with Russians, who suffered enormous material losses in the
past years of conflict. As of now, Ukrainians in absolute terms have lost more in the course of
the incursion, but this is soon going to change. Since August 23rd, the battles continue but do not
bring either side much territorial gains. While Ukrainians are likely again forced to retreat from
Kremyanoe, the 225th Separate Assault Battalion advances to the north of the village, crossing
the river and capturing a number of Russians in the area of Durovka. Some evidence suggests that
Ukrainian troops are present even further to the north and are blocking the railroad that leads to
Korenevo after taking a foothold on the northern bank of the Krepna River and on the outskirts of
Aleksandrovka. This, however, does not degrade Russian logistics much as the main supply routes
enter the town from the west and the complex terrain with rivers prevents any possibility of a
fast encirclement. As we have seen, the rivers are not much of an obstacle for Russians, as they have
plenty of pontoon bridge layers and quite skilled combat engineers, who, yet, take massive losses
from time to time. For example, on August 28th, the Ukrainian 8th Special Operations Regiment
again locates and destroys 6 pontoon bridge layers in just one spot near the frontline.
The already assembled pontoon bridge is also destroyed in the area of Zvannoe by HIMARS, using
intelligence provided by the 14th UAV Regiment. By the end of the month, Ukrainians also
reclaim some positions around Cherkasskoe Porechnoe and again take a foothold in Nechaev.
Russians redeploy to Kursk a few extra units, including “Veterany” Assault Brigade. This
is the latest out of the whole list of units, such as the Arbat battalion, 1428th regiment,
Pyatnashka, and 11th Air Assault Brigades that were removed from the hottest Pokrovsk direction
to mitigate the Kursk Incursion. While this is not enough to immediately halt the Russian
advance there, Ukrainian soldiers note certain relief compared to earlier months of battles.
On September 1st, Ukrainians somewhat improve their position near Malaya Loknya, due to prior
advances to the east and west of this area. The newly formed 152nd Jaeger brigade
is redeployed closer to the salient, but it is not enough to significantly affect the
situation, where both sides consolidated positions and arranged solid drone reconnaissance
that prevents any deep breakthroughs. Around September 4th, Ukrainians start to realize
that with current forces, even a partially cut-off Glushkovo area is impossible to take.
Nevertheless, by September 9th, the last bridge in this area, near the town of Karyzh, is destroyed
by a Ukrainian JDAM-ER glide bomb. Strikes also continue on pontoon bridges across the Seym river,
especially in the area of Zvannoe. On September 10th, the 14th UAV regiment splits up, as a
separate 413th Unmanned Systems Battalion is formed. One of the first targets of the new
unit is a rare Russian remote-mining system, “Zemplidelie” in Glushkovo, which is destroyed
in cooperation with the newly arrived 78th Airborne Assault Regiment on September 12th, by
directing a HIMARS strike. The 14th UAV Regiment also continues work, providing information and
showing HIMARS strikes with cluster GMLRS rockets on Russians near the various river crossings.
As a month has passed since the beginning of the operation, both sides are further fortifying
their positions, fully embracing static warfare, just as in other sectors. Overall, a relatively
small Ukrainian grouping continues to tie down a Russian force several times its size. Now on
the defensive, Ukrainians are, as elsewhere, focused on maximizing adversary losses. Meanwhile,
the Russian command is likely facing increasing pressure from political leadership to bring an
end to what they had previously characterized as a minor raid by sabotage and reconnaissance
groups. This leads to a gradual intensification of brutal assaults, carried out with little regard
for losses. These efforts are clearly visible as Russians begin attacking in large mechanized
columns—something not seen since the battle for Avdiivka. This shift indicates that the Kursk
front now receives priority equal to, or even greater than, that of the Pokrovsk area, as Russia
now commits the modest remains of its equipment to reclaim its own territory. As a result, since
early September, the previously unfavorable ratio of equipment losses for Ukraine begins to shift
closer to one-to-one. And as we began this story with Operation “Seneka”, it makes sense to finish
this chapter by coming back to it. Following phases one and two—diverting Russian attention
prior to the attack and concealing the scale of the offensive as long as possible—Ukrainians
move into phase three. Since August 15th, Ukraine has established the Military Commandant’s
Office of the Kursk Region, headed by Major General Eduard Moskaliov. This office oversees
the execution of plans devised by Ukrainian Psychological and Information Warfare Centers to
build communication channels with local civilians. This includes, first and foremost, thousands of
Russian citizens receiving the means necessary to continue their lives in areas now under Ukrainian
control. This often-overlooked effort has led to the complete absence of civilian resistance or
partisan activity. In stark contrast to 2022, when Russia’s invasion of the Sumy region nearby
triggered widespread sabotage and the destruction of hundreds of vehicles by local partisans,
no such movements have emerged in Kursk. Furthermore, international journalists have been
granted access to the area, and their reporting has consistently reflected an atmosphere of
relative calm and coexistence between local civilians and Ukrainian forces, who continue
their operations along the entire salient. Coming back to the battlefield, on September 9th,
Russians gather a long column of vehicles, mostly tanks and BMDs of the 51st Air Assault Regiment
of the newly arrived 106th Air Assault Division. The column cuts through Ukrainian positions
and quite surprisingly, reaches Snagost and then disperses right behind Ukrainian lines. While
on march, Russian forces met minimal resistance, likely due to a combination of factors like proper
jamming and well-executed reconnaissance, as well as a lack of Ukrainian forces in the area. The
auxiliary assaults by forces of the 155th Marine Brigade also likely helped to distract Ukrainian
forces of the 103rd TDF Brigade and exposed their flank. By some accounts, Russian marines here
similar to other forces deployed to Kursk are also reinforced by former servicemen of Wagner
Group, which use to form PMC’s professional core. By September 11th, it becomes clear that this
raid swept Ukrainians from a few villages south of Korenevo and reopened the land corridor to
Glushkovo as Russians send more reinforcements into created wedge near Snagost. Together
with that, the paratroopers start assaults on Liubimovka. This attack is yet another evidence
that the western flank of the salient, without control over Korenevo is one of few weak spots,
Ukrainians have and they can do little to change that at this point. Russians, also understanding
that, beginning the rapid build up of forces, with the final goal to concentrate most of
their VDV and marines here to replicate the success near the Snagost on a larger scale.
Ukrainians answer with their own flank attack, striking in the area of Veseloe and Medvezhe.
This operation is executed mostly by elements of the swiftly redeployed 225th Assault Battalion
with the support of the elements of the newly arrived 21st Mechanized and 95th Air Assault
Brigades. The assault battalion provides drone support with Khorne Group unit as well as clears
the border fortification. After that, fresh forces of the 21st Brigade on Leopard 2s and CV-90s
surge forward, facing significant resistance, but akin the Russians try to disperse behind enemy
lines. Without reaching significant territorial gains, the Ukrainian forces still divert the
attention of the portion of the 51st Air Assault regiment that was storming Liubimovka, halting the
Russian advance there. Paratroopers still enter the village, but are not capable of advancing as
fast as a few days ago. They also sustain heavy casulties as the area around Liubimovka quickly
turns into the graveyard of Russian vehicles. Just from September 11th to 14th, here, Russians
lost at least 5 BMDs. It is also important to note that these vehicles are notorious for their
lack of armor and easily ignitable ammunition, which explains why almost any hit results in
catastrophic detonation. Head-on assaults on BMDs, therefore, show the urgency with which Russians
try to push Ukrainians out, as well as highlight the inevitable shift to borderline suicidal
assaults, which remain the only tactic Russians employ to achieve territorial gains in absence of
obvious cracks in defenses such as one in Snagost. By September 15th, they also intensify the
attack in the eastern part of the salient, taking Borki village with the combined forces
of the 810th Marine Brigade, as well as Sarmat and Arbat battalions. Russian drone strikes also
become more and more common across the salient, keeping Ukrainian vehicle losses
way higher than the Russian ones. Despite that, from September 15th to 25th, no
other breakthroughs are achieved and the situation more or less hangs in balance again. Ukrainian
command and likely Syrskiy himself, as the author of the operation, face a dilemma. It is quite
obvious that without reinforcements, the weak western flank will soon continue to crumble, since
losses mount for both sides, but the Russians simply renew them faster despite losing more in
countless assaults. The deployment of the fresh 21st brigade showed that introducing more forces
for sure helps to slow down the adversary, but this means weakening other parts of the frontline.
Syrskiy ultimately decides to continue reinforcing the Kursk area, bringing the elements of the
1st and 17th Tank and 41st Mechanized Brigades into action throughout the first half of October.
Ukrainians also continue striking pontoon bridges across the Seym River, keeping Russian logistics
on the western flank under pressure. Since such targets can usually be hit effectively with
HIMARS rockets, Ukrainian aviation—armed with high-precision bombs—shifts its focus toward
Russian positions in Veseloe. This support allows troops to finally secure a foothold in the village
by the end of the month, though the 21st Brigade and auxiliary forces suffered significant losses
in scarce Western equipment during the fighting. Without the element of surprise and with little
cover, Ukrainian mechanized columns faced swarms of Russian drones that destroyed up to ten CV-90s
and one Leopard 2. It is worth noting, however, that unlike assaults involving BMDs, such attacks
on these Western vehicles have a significantly higher survival rate for soldiers due to their
superior design. This is evident not only from the fact that most of the destroyed vehicles
were abandoned by their crews and remained in one piece, but also from footage showing CV-90s
and Leopard 2s—specifically the Swedish Stridsvagn 122 variant—operating after sustaining FPV drone
strikes. In one example, this type of Ukrainian tank is seen evacuating a damaged T-72 across
the border while its own turret burns following a Russian strike. To the east, the Ukrainain
positions are reinforced by elements of the 101st and 129th TDF brigades, including its elite
253rd Assault Battalion “Arey”. Russians at the same time, reinforce the area of Korenevo with the
whole 106th Airborne Division, deploying 119th, and 137th Airborne regiments in addition to the
already present 51st on this narrow part of the frontline. This is nothing but a preparation for
the next wave of attack, akin to those conducted by the 51st Airborne regiment, but on a larger
scale. Backed up by the 234th Air Assault Regiment from the 76th Air Assault Division and 56th
Air Assault Regiment from the 7th Air Assault Division, the Korenevo grouping represents
one of the largest concentrations of elite VDV forces since the battle for Kyiv. The word
elite, however, applies only to a certain portion of it because for a while, even the best Russian
units internally separated into a small portion of valuable and competent specialists and a much more
numerous expendable fraction that is meant for one-way assaults, often but not always referred
to as Storm-V. Though, VDV regiments apparently still maintain a slightly larger fraction of elite
specialists than other motor rifle or tank units. Since October 1st, Russians begin a new wave of
mechanized and infantry assaults on Ukrainian positions around Korenevo. Now, they attack
with replenished marine brigades, mostly used as expandable troops and only afterwards try to
target weak spots with VDV forces. The attacks are directed not only towards Zeleniy Slyakh but also
from the north with elements of the 810th Marine Brigade and in the Veseloe area. For ten days,
Ukrainians successfully repel most of the attacks, but pressure mounts. The Ukrainian command
swiftly redeploys the experienced 47th Mechanized Brigade with its M-1 Abrams and
M-2 Bradleys as well as the full 36th Marine Brigade to the salient, but it is too late.
On October 10th, the Russians finally locate and punch through a weak spot in the area
of Liubimovka and advance into Novoivanovka. Despite the road from Snagost to Zeleniy Shlyakh
becoming one of the first so-called “roads of death” in the Kursk region, due to a huge amount
of destroyed Russian vehicles littering it, the success is significant. Ukrainians were
taken by surprise on many positions, which caused an incident when nine drone operators were
captured by soldiers of the Russian 155th Marine Brigade and executed. Facing prospects of being
cut out in a narrow corridor that is constantly assaulted from all sides, Ukrainians begin the
withdrawal of troops from the Korenevo outskirts. This way, by October 13th, Ukrainians retreat from
Olgovka and Kremyanoe, avoiding the encirclement. Together with that, Russians who paid for another
quick leap forward with hundreds of men and dozens of pieces of equipment are forced to slow down.
The number of aggressive assaults in the area of Pogrebki from October 10th to 16th, which
were meant to cut off the Ukrainian salient towards Korenevo compeltely, apparently fail
due to extremely poor planning. In one video, we can see the BTR-82, likely of the 810th Marine
Brigade that simply drives towards two Ukrainian T-64BVs head-on. The first tank reacts quickly to
the threat and, once the BTR approaches, makes a shot at point blank range. The high-explosive
shell tears apart the thinly armored hull and launches the turret of the vehicle upwards. A few
crew members miraculously survive and surrender. Afterwards, the BTR is shot again, this time with
an armor-piercing shell by the second T-64BV, to make sure it is not going anywhere. To
be fair, one of the T-64BVs that repelled a reckless attack of the Russian BTR-82 is later
destroyed by an FPV drone after it was stuck and abandoned by the crew at exactly the same spot.
To be double fair, behind the forest along which two Ukrainian T-64BVs moved, the whole graveyard
of tightly packed BTR-82s forms as a result of astonishingly bloody and completely pointless
assaults here. One of these was also recorded, featuring how 3 Russian BTRs approach the
abovementioned forest, apparently held by Ukrainians, drop off infantry in the open field,
and retreat. The troops, apparently under fire, immediately panic and also retreat in
complete disarray, taking heavy casualties and demonstrating a practically nonexistent
level of planning and coordination among Russian seemingly elite marines. Such attacks,
by the 810th Marine Brigade, are repeated until most of their BTRs are lost near that forest.
However, the main focus of the Russian command apparently remains on reaching Malaya Loknya
to drive an even deeper wedge in Ukrainian-held territory. At this point, the 155th Marine brigade
finds itself partially encircled from three sides and under drone onslaught, losing dozens of
vehicles to push forward. On October 18th, the Russians conduct mechanized assaults along
the key road from Novoivanovka to Malaya Loknya, but consistently hit drone-dropped landmines,
forming yet another road of death. One of the lucky BTRs that reached closest to the village
is finished off by a Ukrainian tank defending the area. Overall, from October 1st to 20th, in
this area, Russians lost over 50 armored vehicles, and apparently hundreds if not thousands of men
belonging to the 155th Marine Brigade that is close to being completely annihilated in combat
again by combined efforts of the elements of 36th Marine, 47th Mechanized, 82nd and 95th Air Assault
Brigades. This is partially seen as revenge for multiple war crimes the brigade committed, but
much more important is that its role as a ram, which pushed through Ukrainian positions despite
unthinkable losses, is almost over. This is not the first instance of heavy losses in 155th
Marine Brigade, as it was already practically destroyed and routed near Kyiv, then Vuhledar,
and finally near Novomykhailivka, repeating the same catastrophic mistakes over and over.
In conclusion, the recent bloody assaults allowed Russians to reduce the area controlled by
Ukraine from 1300 at its peak to approximately 700 square kilometers by twice exploiting weak
spots in defenses that emerged after dozens of very costly and fruitless assaults. To repeat
this pattern, Russians obviously need to quickly regenerate an expandable fraction of their
forces, and here, they find help from abroad. North Korea, which recently became a key
Russian supplier of millions of artillery shells and hundreds of ballistic missiles, also
sends its own troops to help. For the first time, these soldiers are spotted on training grounds on
October 18th, using mostly Russian equipment. In total, the plan is to receive 12 thousand men
from North Korea as reinforcements for their grouping of forces “North,” which will become the
first direct participation of a third country in the conflict since its beginning. The specific
forces Kim Jong Un sends are hard to identify, but they are collectively referred to as 11th
Corps which includes at least elements of the 92nd and 94th Special Operations Brigades. In reality,
however, its second name, the Storm Corps better reflects its nature of being a unit of mostly
assault infantry without much mechanized assets. While Koreans are still going through the
training, though, we have to mention that despite recent setbacks, Ukrainians still
lose positions mostly on wester flank, while attacks happen pretty much everywhere.
This is because on the eastern or south-eastern parts of the salient, Russians amassed mostly
motor rifle units, which are replenished with men and equipment way slower than the seemingly
elite VDV and marines concentrated to the west. On October 20th, Ukrainians also shoot down an
Orion medium-altitude attack drone. Even though it is the 9th destroyed UAV of this type out of
a few dozen Russians produced, this incident is significant. Orion’s together with Forpost UAVs
were actively used in the Kursk region since very beginning due to a lack of Ukrainian mid-range
air defenses and were responsible for destroying at least a few dozen Ukrainian pieces of equipment
with their own miniature missiles. Called Kh-BPLA, these munitions trace their origins
to Kornet ATGMs, so they combine high accuracy and penetration. Even though the
quantity of drones did not allow Russians to curb the initial breakthrough, medium-altitude
attack UAVs still inflict losses higher than the much more numerous Russian helicopters that were
mostly busy lobbing unguided rockets in highly inaccurate pitch-up attacks after performing a few
high-precision friendly fires we covered earlier. In contrast, Ukrainian aviation showed something
that can be without exaggeration called “resurrection” during the Kursk Offensive. While
the first F-16s were only arriving in August 2024, Ukrainian old Mig-29s and Su-27s were actively
supporting the Ukrainian offensive as never before. The secret lies in adaptation of western
weapons for Soviet airframes, which required years of work, but clearly paid off. French
Hammer bombs, American GBU-39s, and JDAMs all add high precision strike capability that allows
Ukrainian aviation to attack high value targets with something heavier than HIMARS rockets. As we
discussed earlier, this allows Ukrainains not only quite easily collapse bridges used for logistics,
but also increase pressure on enemy forward positions. The Russians are also using their UMPK
glide bombs in Kursk, but those are significantly less precise, even though they still allow Russian
aviation to stay mostly out of range of Ukraianin air defenses. Meanwhile, their own surface-to-air
missile systems are being successfully destroyed in large numbers by various Ukrainian
drones. Therefore, Ukrainians and Russians reach similar effectiveness in the air, but in
two different ways, indicating a significant catch up Ukraine Air Force made since the last
offensive, where it’s activity was fairly low. Another aspect of the air war over the Kursk
region is the use of anti-air interceptor drones—a technology Ukraine has pioneered. We
have already covered how these became a new threat to Russian helicopters, but as of October,
they also play a significant role in taking down Russian attack drones—primarily Lancets—as well
as a variety of fixed-wing reconnaissance drones. Coming back to the ground, by October
21st, Ukrainians launch a counterattack and stabilize the situation around Zeleniy Sliakh,
sweeping Russians away from many positions with the well-coordinated assaults executed by
elements of the 36th Marine, 47th Mechanized, 82nd, and 95th Air Assault Brigades. From the
Russian side, the 1434th Akhmat Chechnya Regiment is urgently redeployed here to support the
virtually destroyed 155th Marine Brigade that starts losing positions it captured a few weeks
ago by paying enormous price in man and equipment. On October 22nd, Russians also start
pushing from the eastern flank, approaching Martynovka with combined forces of
11th and 83rd Air Assault brigades. At this point, more than half of all Russian VDV units
were redeployed to Kursk, which hints that the Ukrainian official goal of diverting
Russian forces is undeniably achieved, even though there will be a significant lag between
redeployment and slowdown in combat on other critical parts of the frontline, such as Pokrovsk.
By the end of the month, Russians again go into replenishment mode and have to accumulate men
and equipment for the next leap forward. It is important to mention that combat, especially
around Zeleniy Sliakh, does not stop for a day, but during this time is characterized by the
Russians just using and losing less equipment and troops, gaining virtually no ground. There,
once again signifying the terrible state of the notorious 155th Marine Brigade, the positions
are reinforced by the 137th Airborne regiment and 83rd Air Assault Brigade. After at least partial
redeployment of the 225th Assault Battalion and 95th Air Assault Brigade to the area of Zeleniy
Shliakh, the Ukrainian advances near Veseloe also halt. Seeing no further chance to cut off this
area, Ukrainians make a decision to retreat, especially as the 21st Mechanized brigade
suffered heavy losses in men and equipment due to the activity of Russian fiber optic FPVs,
the timely redeployment of the VDV forces, and overall poor operation planning. However,
since forces are tied in heavy combat, the elements of the 47th mechanized brigade were
redeployed here as well to cover the withdrawal. Despite Bradleys and Abrams tanks being actively
targeted by drones and ATGMs, they successfully evacuate friendly forces across the border
after conducting bold raids on a number of Russian positions and suppressing them with fire.
On November 2nd, Russians intensify attacks from the north, with still more or less battle-capable
and replenished 810th Marine Brigade. They again probe Ukrainian positions, vastly outnumbering
the enemy, and seemingly find the right weak spot. Unable to take Malaya Loknya from the
western flank, they decide to strike from the north, moving along the river, which
conveniently splits Ukrainian defenses. On November 7th, Russians lauch a new major
offensive, now trying to reach Malaya Loknya from the north with swift mechanized assaults.
Over a dozen of thin-armored BTR-82s of 810th Marine Brigade depart from Novosyolovka in a large
column. The vehicles reach Novaya Sorochyna, but there is a caveat. At this point, the Ukrainian
drones and landmines already destroyed 11 BTR-82s along the road, completely shattering Russian
plans by wiping out the whole attack force. Auxiliary strikes from the west also fail,
concluding one of the bloodies and largest mechanized assaults in a long time. The reasons
why this attack failed range from absence of proper reconnaissance to the fact that the
area was timely reinforced with 95th Air Assault Brigade, whose positions were earlier
taken by 17th Tank Brigade. It is also clear that 810th Marine Brigade repeats the fate of
155th, executing borderline suicidal orders of higher command. Both eastern and western
flanks, which Russians also constantly probe, Ukrainians meanwhile reinforce with the
4th and 6th Ranger Regiments, which were recently created to bridge the gap between Special
Operations Forces and regular mechanized troops. On the next day, the Russian command again
throws forces of the 810th Marine Brigade towards Pogrebki, which causes more losses and
even fewer territorial gains than the day before. At the same time, the Russian 83rd Air Assault
Brigade begins assaults in the area of Darino, with mixed results. VDV forces suffer heavy losses
in BMDs and troops, but using numerical advantage push Ukrainians back. Around Zeleniy Shlyak,
Russians have no progress and only losses. On November 11th, 155th brigade briefly comes
back to the frontline here, just to repeat the brutal mechanized assaults. What’s interesting
is that past losses likely force it to use in head on assaults combination of BMPs and MTLBs
instead of BTR-82s and the least trained soldiers, causing catastrophic losses again. In quite
an ironic incident, Russian marines even drown two of their BMP-3s with extra armor
and flags in the river near Novoivanovka. On November 12th, the attacks are repeated again,
but what’s interesting is that the 155th and 810th Marine brigades start actively using “Akhmat”
MRAPs instead of BTR-82s that took heavy losses before. Overall, however, columns become smaller
and are burnt down entirely in the process of attacks by the new Special Operations Drone Unit
in the area called “Faust” as well as the Birds of Madyar and UAV companies of local brigades.
Combined efforts allow Ukrainians to destroy up to a dozen armored vehicles daily just on the western
flank of the salient, according to the footage. One of the assaults is particularly interesting
because it happens not far away from the forest, where a Ukrainian tank destroyed a Russian BTR
at point-blank range. In one of the videos, the 8th Special Operations Regiment shows how
four Akhmat MRAPs are taken out one by one by FPVs. Another interesting detail is that on
the same intersection, a month ago, Russians abandoned two BTR-82s and since then have not
evacuated them. This once again shows how drones are capable of basically isolating parts of the
battlefield. Eventually, these two are destroyed, bringing the Russian vehicle losses on this
small intersection to 6 in a single day. However, we picked this assault for a more detailed
breakdown also because there is a video of the area from the Russians. It was filmed in February
2025 and shows what the roads of death created by drones look like. Once again, we can pretty much
see all the damaged equipment left in the fields, indicating a lack of any effort to evacuate it.
Moreover, 4 more vehicles were destroyed here as well, and this is if we don’t count UAZ-452 loaf
and civilian cars. Note that this is considered an average Russian assault vehicle graveyard
as roads near Zeleniy Shlyakh are filled with destroyed equipment even more densely, which
we will show later. This footage is the best evidence of the remarkable incompetence of the
Russian command and shows exactly how the Kursk Offensive forced them to pull equipment needed
everywhere on the frontline to defend Russia itself with rather questionable effectiveness.
November 13th becomes the last day of something that could be called massive mechanized assaults
in this area. The Russian 115th and 810th Marine Brigades effectively destroyed themselves against
Ukrainian defenses and drones without significant territorial gains. Quite numerous VDV units
were more careful and sustained significant, but not yet catastrophic losses, but most of their
assaults were also pointless, effectively taking back only one village. In conclusion, the third
Russian offensive wave in the Kursk region ends in complete disaster. From November 7th to November
14th, in just one week, Russians lost 72 pieces of equipment according to photographic evidence.
This is just on the western flank of the Kursk salient or roughly 25 kilometers of the frontline.
For the same area and time span, Ukrainians lost 4. Such Russian vehicle losses were unseen since
the battle of Avdiivka, where mindless assaults of huge columns were mostly happening in the area
of the villages of Stepove and Krasnohorivka. It was widely accepted that Russians would
no longer waste so much equipment due to its looming shortage, but the Kursk offensive
forced the Russian command to totally rewrite their plans. It is also worth discussing why.
War in Ukraine since the first day has been a multidimensional conflict, with particularly
important details extending beyond maps. For example, Ukraine, as well as Russia, significantly
rely on their allies or at least partners since the conflict became a multi-year war of attrition.
Therefore, maintaining and extending military and financial aid or undermining the support provided
to the opponent are things that directly shape the battlefield. With United States being one of
the key donors of military equipment for Ukraine, it is plausible that one of the many goals
of Kursk Offensive was to show to whoever wins the Presidential elections on November
5, 2024 that Ukraine while undeniably being on the backfoot, carries potential to shape the
conflict the way it wants and generally speaking, is not a lost cause. Subsequently,
the goal of Russia was to convince the next US Administration in the opposite.
Thus, it makes sense to link the unusually heavy use of armor in assaults, which is harmful
strategically, but can be beneficial tactically, to the Russian plans to deal with the incursion by
the time of the election, or at least by the end of November. Some sources suggest that the first
deadlines set by the Kremlin for the military command expired in October, but these are mostly
unsupported claims. In any case, the three major waves of Russian attacks in Kursk reduced the
area controlled by Ukrainians roughly by half, but they are nowhere near the end goal of
completely pushing the adversary behind the border. Moreover, mindlessly throwing poorly
protected armor against drones and landmines once again proved to be a recipe for mass casualties.
With most of the storage bases more than half empty at this point, destroying hundreds of
pieces of Russian equipment, urgently pulled out of the last reserves inside Russia, is yet another
overlooked achievement of the Kursk Incursion. Combing back to the battlefield itself, as of
November 15th, the Russian efforts to advance on the western flank of the salient, especially
near Darino and Zeleniy Shlakh, continue to result in equipment and men losses, but no breakthroughs
are achieved. Russian columns usually pile up at some bottlenecks, stopped by landmine,s and
eventually finished off by the drones. This happens day after day without much change, which
shows the level of disregard of the local Russian command for their own soldiers, comparable to
the one demonstrated in battles for Vuhledar. On November 17th, the White House grants
permission to use ATACMS ballistic missiles against targets on Russian land. This decision
also extends to Franco-British Storm Shadow cruise missiles with American components. As
much as this is another positive impact of the Kursk operation that crossed too many Russian red
lines at this point, Ukraine has to be careful with the choice of targets since a big fraction
of missiles have already been used and the number of remaining ones remains in low double digits.
Around November 18th, the controversial reports about Plekhovo surface, which indicates that
Russians are at least increase their activity around the town with unknown results. Most likely,
the situation here mimics one around Novoivanovka, which is for a long time is not fully controlled
by Ukrainian troops, but belongs more to a grey zone since Ukrainians sometimes launch attacks
inside the village to clash with the adversary. By November 20th, Ukrainians retreat
from the salient south of Kremyanoe, likely to prevent a possible encirclement. It was
3 km in its narrowest point, so getting in and out of positions there was extremely dangerous
under drone-controlled skies. With hindsight, it is important to mention that once any corridor
becomes too narrow, the FPV drones are capable of literally patrolling it 24/7, completely cutting
out any logistics. This, in turn, makes holding positions impossible and essentially is a modern
way to isolate parts of the battlefield without having a single soldier behind enemy lines.
Ukraine, meanwhile, also conducts its first strike with Storm Shadow missiles as well as
regular HIMARS GMLRS rockets on the Russian command post. It was hidden in the bunker near the
village of Marino, so the use of Storm Shadows, which also have bunker-busting properties, was
extremely relevant. In the strike, directed by drones of the 78th Air Assault Regiment and 413th
UAV battalion, 18 officers are killed and 33 are wounded, including 3 North Koreans and likely
Lieutenant General Valeriy Solodchuk, deputy commander of the Leningrad Military District.
This is the first, but not last attack which aims to cripple Russian chains of command to disrupt
continuing brutal assaults in the Kursk region. On November 25th, Ukrainians also destroy
the 92N6E radar station and two launchers of the Russian state of art S-400 air defense
system with three ATACMS missiles in the area of Bolshoe Zhirovo, not far from Kursk.
Among killed are two crew members and three engineers that were servicing the system.
On land, Russians somewhat intensify attacks on Ukrainian positions, on November 26th, driving
a large column of the 104th Guards Air Assault Regiment through Zeleniy Slyakh. As usual, assault
is poorly planned because the head of column is composed of thinly armed aluminum BMDs, loaded
with a huge amount of ammunition and paratroopers. On the densely mined road, these explode one
after the other without the slightest chance for troops inside. The T-72 that followed BMDs
apparently hits a landmine and falls off the road, just to be soon finished by an FPV drone. The
same fate awaits another tank of the same type, which, for some reason, was at the very
end of the column. One of the BMDs, after seeing the literal evaporation of 3 other
vehicles in front, apparently decides to retreat, turning around and driving quite far away, but
it hits a landmine too, likely also dropped from the drone and finished off by FPV after being
abandoned. Apparently, it was not loaded with too much ammo, which saved crew’s lives, who yet
were later killed by drone-dropped grenades. This assault also features two quite rare Russian Buran
infantry mobility vehicles. Surprisingly, these proved much safer than BMDs, likely saving the
crews’ lives instead of incinerating them after both struck landmines. This once again highlights
the advantage of MRAPs over traditional vehicles: their combination of speed, light but still
effective armor, and the absence of easily flammable munitions inside gives crews far
greater chances of surviving drone strikes compared to traditional IFVs or APCs, especially
Soviet models. As we have already seen, it is Ukraine—not Russia—that primarily operates MRAPs,
and this advantage continues to save countless lives. Exactly MRAPs, which are also far easier to
replace than tanks and IFVs, make up the largest share of Ukraine’s relatively high vehicle losses.
While Russians continue their regular mechanized assaults with vehicle columns on the western
flank of the salient, they also begin similar daily attacks against Ukrainian positions around
Plekhovo. Here, the 129th TDF brigade and its drone company “Ravens”, which are not as famous
as the 47th Mechanized or 95 Air Assault Brigades, does an excellent job in repelling attacks.
The fields to the east of Plekhovo are littered with remains of 18 BTR-82s that
were destroyed from November 12th to 30th. This forces Russians to switch to more common
and costly tactics of small infantry groups, which have to walk towards positions through
open fields under constant drone strikes. Throughout November, numerous reports surfaced
about first engagements involving North Korean soldiers. If these accounts are accurate, it
suggests that Russian forces were attempting to quietly integrate them into existing
units—reportedly those from Buryatia and other eastern regions of Russia—where their
presence could be more easily obscured. However, as the Kremlin grows increasingly desperate to
drive Ukrainian forces out of the Kursk region before the New Year, efforts at concealment appear
to be abandoned. In a significant escalation, 12,000 of allegedly Kim Jong Un’s most
capable troops have now been deployed to Kursk in full force, no longer hidden and
ready to confront Ukrainian troops head-on. On December 14th, the floodgates open. North
Koreans attack simultaneously in the area of Kruglenkoe, Pogrebki, Naydenov,
and near recently captured Plekhovo, moving in large chaotic formations through the
snowy fields towards Ukrainian positions. What is interesting is that Russians apparently did not
provide their allies with any armored vehicles, nor teach them to move in small infantry
groups. Therefore, quite predictably, North Korean troops employed tactics from their last
war that ended in 1953, attacking in large human waves. Ukrainians immediately employ FPV drones,
as well as probably the most appropriate weapons to counter this tactic, cluster munitions. Such
155mm shells, as well as cluster GMLRS rockets, quickly devastate North Korean ranks, while
drones no longer have to search for targets, instead picking and choosing whom to take out on
the open terrain. Even seeing how their allies sustain mass casualties, the Russians do little to
assist them, as fields where they used to attack in mechanized columns are quite literally covered
by hundreds of killed North Korean soldiers, the massacre not seen since the times of battle for
Bakhmut. Together with that, it would be unfair to say that assaults were entirely without results.
DPRK troops push Ukrainians from many positions on the northern flank of the salient, where
Russians were unable to achieve any breakthroughs for months. In response, Ukrainians redeploy the
144th Infantry Brigade to the salient, to let the 22nd Mechanized Brigade reinforce positions there
together with operatives of the elite 73rd Naval Center of Special Operations and rangers. Elements
of the 8th Special Operations Regiment, which are also seen across the salient, focus their efforts
around Kruglenkoe, clashing with and killing dozens of North Koreans in quick attacks that
leverage communication hurdles between Russians and their new allies. Meanwhile, Russian assaults
also continue, in particular in the notorious area of Zeleniy Sliakh on the western flank. There, the
Russian 34th Motor Rifle Brigade and a few other regiments arrive to support VDV forces after
their extremely costly but pointless assaults. By December 18th, using overall
increased pressure on Ukrainians, Russians also make minor gains near Zeleniy Shlyak
and Plekhovo. The next day, they drive a wedge in Ukrainian positions in the northwestern part
of the salient as well as close on Martynovka. In an attempt to slow down the advance, Ukrainians
intensify strikes on Russian command posts, destroying one in Rylsk on December 20th.
On December 21st, Ukrainians continue to lose positions near Plekhovo as Russians take
a foothold in Kurilovka. At the same time, attempts to cross the border here are stopped. By
that time, Russians apparently decide to change the way they use North Koreans because a week of
human wave assaults annihilated a big fraction of the whole force. Thus, from now on, DPRK units,
which apparently were deployed and acted as 4 separate brigades, are slowly withdrawn, atomized
and placed under the command of the Russian units. This way, they are still used as purely expendable
troops and continue to take heavy losses, but at least the media effect from hundreds of eliminated
North Koreans in open fields is mitigated. No DPRK soldiers were also taken as prisoners
despite Ukrainian forces entering close-quarters combat with them, which is pretty easy to explain.
Language barrier as well as ideological training, thanks to which North Koreans allegedly believe
they are fighting American and South Korean troops in Kursk, make surrender among DPRK troops
almost impossible. Evidence shows that they would much more readily take their own life with
a hand grenade in any desperate situation. On December 23rd, Ukrainians reinforce Zeleniy
Sliakh area with the battalion of the 116th TDF brigade, likely to free up forces to mitigate
a dangerous wedge to the north. However, by December 22nd, Russians, mostly
using Koreans for one-way assaults, further expand it. Using the same tactic,
Russians also advance into Cherkasskaya Konopelka. On December 25th, Ukrainians answer by
destroying the command post of what was left of the Russian 810th Marine Brigade
in Lgov with GMLRS rockets. The strikes kill the deputy commander of the brigade, Salim
Pashtov, as well as other officers of the unit. By December 30th, Ukrainians slightly
improve their positions in Kruglenkoe, where Russians had earlier created a small
wedge towards Malaya Loknya. By the next day, this wedge is fully liquidated as Ukrainian
8th Special Operations and 6th Ranger Regiments launched multiple converging assaults, taking
out most of the North Korean troops holding it with the help of drones. On the eastern flank
of the salient, both Russians and Ukrainians have certain success, assaulting positions of
each other as elements of the Ukrainian 67th Mechanized Brigade arrive here. The year ends wth
Ukrainians more or less stabilizing the situation in the Kursk region after quite chaotic and
bloody battles with a mix of Russian and North Korean troops in the second half of December.
The strike with Storm Shadow missiles in Lgov on this day also kills 8 and wounds 22 officers
of the VDV, among whom are Chief of Division Communications Valery Tereshchenko, commander
of the engineering battalion Pavel Maletsky from 76th Division, and Deputy Chief of
Staff Ali Tsurov from the 104th Division. On January 2nd, the command post of
the 810th Marine Brigade is attacked, this time in Ivanovskoe, right during the ceremony
where Russian officers were receiving awards. Even though the brigade is less active due to heavy
losses, its command was likely playing a big role in the overall planning of grouping operations.
The next day, the Russians advance back to the recently lost positions near Sudzha.
They also continuously try to establish pontoon bridges for their VDV forces in the Darino
area as their focus shifts to attempts to create an encirclement out of the Ukrainian
salient by advancing into the Sumy region. Meanwhile, Ukrainians are also eager to attack
after repelling hundreds, if not thousands Russian assaults in the course of the last four months.
Having limited reserves and a much lower tolerance to losses, they prepare for the counterattack
much more rigorously than the Russians. Ukrainian command chooses a quite deprioritized part of the
frontline, attacking from the southern part of Cherkasskoe Porechnoe while avoiding mined roads.
The first ones to go are Bergepanzer 2 engineering vehicles with mineplows that create a corridor
for the rest of the attack force. All armor, tanks, Strykers, and MRAPs are covered in
cages with elastic nets as well as have new jamming equipment. Thus, no vehicles are lost
to mines, and radio-controlled FPV drones of the Akhmat regiment mostly fall to the ground
upon approaching the column. Fiber-optic FPVs still score hits, destroying three Strykers, M577,
and a few MRAPs according to the footage, but this is about all the Russians can do. The column
arrives at the village of Berdin, allowing the infantry to disembark and enter brutal combat with
Russian infantry. Overall, Ukrainians have managed to advance 2.5 kilometers forward with minimal
losses in a drone-dominated environment, showing that with proper reconnaissance and equipment,
it is still possible to conduct limited attacks. Berdin, however, remains in Russian hands,
as Ukrainians retreat from it after brutal close-quarters combat, taking positions in
nearby treelines. Eventually, by January 6th, Russians in a number of costly assaults recapture
most of the positions Ukrainians took here, even though, certain buffer zone in front of
Cherkasskoe Porechnoe remains in Ukrainian hands. As we mentioned, fiber-optic FPVs it is also
a good time to talk about their effectiveness. First of all, their ability to bypass jamming and
fly long distances is certainly a remarkable leap forward. Ukrainians play catch-up here, already
using their own kind of such drones developed by specialists of the Birds of Madyar unit, but
more time for mass production is needed. Together with all advantages, fiber-optic drones are also
slower, and their warheads tend to be slightly smaller due to the necessity to carry extra spools
of fiber optic itself. Despite a large amount of footage published by Russians, unlike Ukrainians,
they tend not to show the aftermath of the strikes from the second drone, which hints that not every
hit is successful. It is especially relevant for vehicles such as Leopard 2s, Challengers, and
Bradleys, which by no means are invincible, but can survive dozens of hits from radio and
fiber-optic FPVs, especially if equipped with nets and jammers. A good example of this is not
only videos of Bradleys surviving the hits during missions we discussed earlier, but also the
following footage. Here we can clearly see an immobilized and abandoned Bradley IFV, which is
hit by the Russian fiber optic FPV drone from the side. The drone operator misidentifies Bradley as
Marder in video captions and also aims not at the side armor itself, but the block of BRAT reactive
armor shielding it. The first drone either loses connection or deals no damage, so the Russians
send another one. The second FPV detonates, likely hitting armor at a better angle, but what
the third drone actually shows is that only one segment of reactive armor was destroyed while the
Bradley hull remained intact. For some reason, Russians claim a kill here, even though it is
not, but to be fair, with such activity of drones, it is unlikely the vehicle was evacuated.
Nevertheless, what this footage shows is that the era of armored vehicles and tanks
is not over. It is rather the era of poorly designed armored vehicles and tanks, which
had a slight chance before, is actually over. Russians also continue their attacks, suffering
heavy losses in exchange for small land gains. Their planning relies so much on numerical
superiority and nothing else that sometimes, simply unthinkable scenarios happen. For
example, while Ukrainians were storming Berdin, to the west of Russkoe Porechnoe, either
Russians or North Koreans launched their attack, as a result of which, a few infantrymen ended up
stranded in the open field. The Stryker IFV of the 80th Air Assault Brigade, likely being out of
ammunition, quite literally circles around them, trying to run over the adversary infantry.
At least two soldiers are taken out this way, once again demonstrating how little
support one-way Russian assaults can have. On January 7th, Russians enter Makhnovka to the
south of Sudzha. We rarely visit the frontline here as Russians rely on the same tactic, making
only slight progress here and there. But this progress, accumulated over months, means that
they get closer and closer to Ukrainian supply lines that go through Sudzha. Ukrainian command,
also understands that, redeploying here the 33rd Assault Regiment, which expanded from a battalion
that took part in the initial breakthrough in August 2024. A similar situation happens near
Darino. Russians constantly attack with various VDV regiments, usually taking heavy casualties but
infiltrating behind the key river in this area. By January 8th, Russians also dangerously
approach Malaya Loknya, so the 17th Heavy Mechanized Brigade conducts a number of assaults
in Nikolskiy, which is mostly in the grey zone. Overall, constant assaults of North Koreans and
Russians in this area start to result less of losses and more gains, possibly due to exhaustion
of Ukrainian brigades holding it. Even though Ukraine concentrated here both well-equipped and
motivated troops, recently reinforced with at least one battalion of the 92nd Assault Brigade,
they were under constant pressure for the last three months, also losing men and equipment due
to the high activity of drones. For example, if we take the 47th Mechanized Brigade, mostly equipped
with American armored vehicles and tanks, it lost 3 M-1 Abrams Tanks throughout this period, which
may seem insignificant, as the Russians can easily lose as many tanks in a single mechanized assault.
However, note that the brigade operates only 30 tanks of this kind, all that the US has managed to
provide, and has already lost 15 M-1 tanks before the Kursk Incursion. So, its total tank losses
are 60% of the total strength. Together with that, being the main user of M2 Bradleys, the
brigade lost 20 of the IFVs for the same time period. The losses of other units, mostly
using Soviet equipment, are likely higher, not just in vehicles but also in men, because almost
all Bradleys and Abrams tanks were successfully abandoned by crews after critical damage, which
is often not the case for T-64 tanks or BMPs. On January 10th, Russians also try to infiltrate
through the Ukrainian border to the west of the salient. First, the BTS-4 armored engineering
vehicles try to destroy the anti-tank ditch, but it is quickly burned down by drones.
Then, Russians, for some reason, bring a single uparmored MTLB to the area, which is also
destroyed by drones. So, despite how dangerous two converging strikes through the border can
be for Ukraine’s grouping, the Russian command still heavily prioritizes head-on assaults in the
northern part of the salient, which mostly end with high losses and allow Ukrainian retreat quite
safely in case of possible encirclement. Something like that happens when Russians and North Koreans
conduct heavy assaults of Russkoe Porechnoe, with moderate success. Russian aviation, which a few
months ago was actively dropping hundreds of UMPK glide bombs on Ukrainian positions, is forced to
decrease the number of sorties due to bad weather, which results in significant icing on aircraft.
On January 11th, the first North Korean soldiers are taken as prisoners by servicemen of the 95th
Air Assault Brigade as well as the 8th Regiment of Special Operations Forces after being wounded
and apparently unable to resist. In contrast, Russians sometimes surrender by the dozens in the
Kursk region. It is usually linked to the insane orders they continue to receive, especially after
breaking another deadline for pushing Ukrainians out of the Kursk region completely. In January,
the first North Korean heavy weapons also started appearing in the Kursk region. These are the
Bulsae-4 ATGM system, M-1978 Koksan howitzers, and even a localized version of the soviet
Tor Air Defense System. This further highlights the slowly approaching shortages
of equipment in the Russian army, as well as deepening cooperation between the countries.
Sometimes, however, cooperation has unintended consequences as the only seen North Korean Tor
was actually destroyed by a Russian FPV drone crew in the Kursk region and later labeled as
western-made radar in the disposal of Ukrainians. By January 16th, Russians continue assaults, once
again, trying to cross the border to the west of the salient. This time, they bring 4 BMP-2s
and one BMD, but the assault is again quickly curbed by FPVs. The Russian infantry eventually is
forced to retreat, without much territorial gains in the Sumy region. These repeated border
attacks might serve diversionary purposes, but since they are thwarted mostly by a
handful of drones, Ukrainians do not really redeploy any reserves here. Overall, January is
characterized by a slowdown in Russian advances. Massive columns become less common in the Kursk
region, while near Pokrovsk, Russia’s seemingly unstoppable territorial gains of the past also
stall, likely since strategic reserves prepared for further assault on key Donbas city are tied
down in the North. It does not mean, however, that massive assaults do not happen at all.
On January 19th, Russians use slightly modified tactics, splitting their armor into three groups
that apparently have different destinations. One group of three BMP-3s has to disembark infantry
near the treeline south of Malaya Loknya. Upon arrival, however, armored vehicles face drones of
the 47th Mechanized Brigade, which, in a matter of minutes, cause catastrophic explosions in
each vehicle. This happens because BMP-3, which is meant to rival Bradley, has extremely
weak armor on its sides and, in most cases, is filled with 100-mm shells for its main gun,
which is supposed to be a key advantage. However, it so drastically reduces crew survivability
that most of the vehicles are enveloped in flames long before they even make first shots.
The next group is likely stopped with landmines and artillery, so the Russian infantry has
time to retreat. Quite soon, their two BMP-3s are finished off by drones, same as the T-80BVM
that was lagging behind, even though it survived a few hits from FPVs before and likely was
supposed to be on the spearhead of the attack. Two BMP-3s reach Nikolskiy, just to face more
drones that once again cause catastrophic detonations with no survivors in each vehicle.
This way, yet another Russian mechanized assault ends without any territorial gains.
Meanwhile, Ukrainians with forces of the newly arrived 33rd Assault Regiment push Russians
back in Makhnovka, improving their positions. On January 20th, despite multiple thwarted
assaults, Ukrainian troops remain mostly on positions along the Malaya Loknya river. This
mimics the situation in other parts of the western flank of the salient, where the Snagost River
also plays an important role in how the Ukrainian defense in a situation of a sharp deficit of
men is structured. Trying to regain positions next to the river near Sudzha, Ukrainians also
advance in the area of Makhnovka by January 24th. On January 28th, 225th Assault Battalion is
expanded into a regiment. Inside the salient, the Ukrainian command also redeploys the
210th Assault Regiment “Berlingo”. Together with the 33rd Assault Regiment, also recently
expanded, these form something unofficially called Syrskiy’s assault guard. All because
the idea to form smaller than brigades and highly specialized assault units belonged to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi. The beginning of the
Kursk Offensive was a proof of concept since the 225th and 33rd Assault Battalions were
capable of deploying quickly and covertly, and, at the same time, attack exactly where Syrskiy
needed. Larger brigades with their own staff and degree of autonomy received more general
orders to hold or advance into the area, but surgical strikes had to be executed by
smaller units. Exactly for such strikes, Syrskiy, who often resorts to micromanagement of
critical parts of the frontline, grew his assault guard. He is often criticised for that since
his predecessor, Valeriy Zaluzhniy, intervened way less into the work of his subordinates
and gave a wide degree of autonomy. However, it is important to remember that Syrskiy and
Zaluzhniy operated in completely different situations and thus faced different challenges.
Syrskiy, in particular, inherited the army with serious manpower shortages and a very problematic
lifecycle of new brigade formation. So, as long as Assault regiments under the direct command of
the Commander-in-Chief are capable of performing tasks and inflict disproportionate losses on
the adversary, it is hard to criticize them. Once again reinforcing the importance
of terrain, by the end of the month, the Russians are able to advance mostly in the
area between the rivers of Snagost and Malaya Loknya, after a number of brutal assaults.
Now, as surprising as it is, half of the year has passed since the beginning of the Ukrainian
Kursk Incursion. Throughout December and January, the greatest single change was the involvement
of North Korean troops in direct combat. What’s interesting is that over the last few weeks
of January, these were mostly withdrawn from the Kursk frontline. The single believable
reason for that is mass casualties, which wore down a 12,000-man strong grouping to the point of
combat ineffectiveness. As we mentioned, the first human wave attacks of North Korean troops were
disastrous for them, but the situation likely did not improve once these were atomized and
subordinated to regular Russian army units. With little regard to the lives of fellow soldiers,
which were demonstrated by continuous suicidal assaults, Russian commanders had even less concern
for new allies and simply annihilated them against Ukrainian defenses, which returned the situation
to the status quo by the end of January. It’s clear that the soldiers Kim Jong
Un sent have little in common with true Special Operations Forces, but they were still,
mostly young and motivated men with prior service experience. To use them effectively, Russians
only needed to teach their new allies how to fight in a battlefield dominated by drones—how
to move in small groups, employ FPVs for strikes, and operate reconnaissance UAVs. Yet despite
at least a month on Russian training grounds, their first attacks showed quite clearly
that this training was never provided. And the results were predictable, with approximately
a quarter of groupings being killed or wounded in the second half of December. However, DPRK
troops were learning, as later footage shows them operating FPVs and reconnaissance drones
in a proper manner, as well as testing some of their own gear, such as the Bulsae-4 ATGM system.
Even though it happened only after heavy losses, the introduction of North Koreans and their
adaptation still allowed Russians to withdraw depleted marine brigades and other units, while
further increasing pressure on Ukrainians. This, in turn, led to further territorial gains.
In addition, the lessons that survivors of Kursk carry home may one day reshape the way
North Korea fights wars far beyond Ukraine. As of the end of January, the Ukrainian-held
salient into Kursk shrank to roughly 400 square kilometers after being over 1000 square kilometers
at its peak. Despite continuous pressure, Russia did not manage to achieve at least local
rapid breakthroughs as in the first counterattacks against the salient, mostly due to Ukrainians
doing solid work with fortifications and mining, as well as keeping the pressure high with drones.
What’s interesting is that Russians continued to supply their Grouping of Forces north with the
best equipment they could get in a situation of not just looming, but quite real armor shortages.
When we were discussing the assault where the Russians lost 7 BMP-3s almost simultaneously due
to drones and landmines, on the other parts of the frontline, they were seen driving into head-on
assaults literally on civilian cars. This clearly shows that Kursk is prioritized the same as
Pokrovsk, if not more. The advance there, by the way, significantly slowed down, and this is what
we are referring to as the strategic effect of the Kursk Offensive. There was quite a significant
time lag, and the halt is not complete, but the situation for Ukrainians there looks
much better than in the Summer or Fall of 2024. One of the speculations, which we see as
plausible, is that one of the goals of the Kursk Incursion was to ultimately exchange the captured
land for something or at least use it as leverage during negotiations. Yet since early 2025, it
has become evident that piece talks pushed by the new US Administration are a true zero-sum
game for Ukraine and Russia. Kursk carried the potential to be a card for both Ukrainians
and Americans in discussions with Russia, but the White House’s decision to avoid pressuring
Moscow stripped it of any value. In the end, the “zero-sum game” left both sides holding…
just zero. So, the battle shall continue. Coming back to the battlefield, On February
6th, exactly one month after the previous tactical counterattack, Ukrainians launch another
mechanized assault to regain lost positions in the Kursk region. This time, the mechanized column
departs from Kolmakov, bypassing Cherkasskaya Konopelka with the goal of dropping infantry
in Fanaseevka. Overnight before the assault, Ukrainian engineering equipment was actively
clearing the grey zone area from landmines and even established a mechanized bridge on the key
route inside the village of Kolmakov. Apparently, the Ukrainian command also slightly corrected
the approach since the last counterattack that was quickly mitigated, and now uses significantly
more vehicles. However, once again, the emphasis in attack was made on the proper use of cages,
jamming, and engineering equipment. Ukrainian Bergepanzer 2 and Wincent 1 MC vehicles, with the
support of tanks, make paths for MRAPs and IFVs in fields, bypassing a few Russian positions there
and avoiding mined roads. Russian radio-controlled FPVs are either all jammed or are not used at
all, while fiber-optic FPVs inflict modest losses, destroying a few MRAPs and one Ukrainian T-64,
hit three times before being abandoned by its crew. Despite that, the group of MRAPs with
Ukrainian Air Assault Forces spearhead into Fanaseevka along the road, bypassing reinforced
positions in Cherkasskaya Konopelka. After the infantry takes a foothold in the village, enemy
counterattacks are repelled, unlike a month ago in Berdin, where Russian infantry prevailed.
Overall, the operation, while being risky, drives a significant wedge south of Sudzha, but
does not really change things strategically, remaining another purely tactical counterattack.
It is important to note that because every such counterattack of Ukrainian forces is usually
labeled by many war observers as a new major counteroffensive, when it reaches its tactical
goals it is immediately recognized as a failure. Yet, such advances provide a temporary relief
for forces, allow to cover up troop rotations, for example, reinforcements for 61st Mechanized
Brigade, and raise morale. Still, strategically, Ukrainian positions remain weakened here, with
defense mostly anchored on 33rd Assault Regiment. After all, Russians are already using fiber-optic
FPVs inside Sudzha due to past advances towards the city, degrading Ukrainian logistics daily.
Drones also actively target Ukrainian artillery, inflicting heavy losses on it. Fortunately
for Ukrainians, steady stream of domestically produced Bohdana Self-Propelled Howitzers covers
up these losses. On the western flank, the 155th Marine Brigade comes back to the frontline after
a few months of recovery due to being virtually destroyed, along with the 810th Marine Brigade.
North Koreans also return after a certain break, as Russians use what was left of them mostly in
the northwestern part of the salient. The newly arrived Khimera drone unit provides Ukrainian
troops with enough support to repel most attacks there. At the same time, the overall picture
increasingly shows a gradual withdrawal of forces from the Kursk region. Apart from the 501st
Marine Battalion, it is difficult to identify all the specific units involved in gradual
retreat, but under relentless drone pressure and political constraints, Oleksandr Syrskiy has no
illusions that the operation is nearing its end. Thus, his attention also shifts toward Pokrovsk,
where the Ukrainians not only managed to halt Russian advances but even execute several sharp
counterattacks using elements of Syrskiy’s assault regiments not engaged in the fighting around
Kursk. This, in turn, placed the fate of the ongoing battles in the north into the hands of
Brigadier General Oleksiy Shandar. As the deputy commander of the Air Assault Forces, Shandar
had participated in the planning of the Kursk Offensive, though he remained overshadowed
by Syrskyi. The Commander-in-Chief directly controlled nearly every unit in the area, with
the close assistance of Chief of General Staff, Anatoliy Bargelevich—an arrangement that had made
both the rapid initial advance and the subsequent strong defense possible. The fortifications built
around small Kursk villages and along the border were organized primarily by Major General Dmytro
Krasilnikov, who assumed command of Operational Command “North” after Shandar was promoted
to lead the Operational-Tactical Grouping of Forces “Siversk” fighting in Kursk region.
By February 9th, Ukrainians regain control over several positions on the western bank of the
Malaya Loknya River. At the same time, Russians, having finally established reliable crossings
over the Snagost River after a month of fighting, advance toward Sverdlikovo. It quickly becomes
clear that their success is not due to sheer luck, but the result of redeploying a significant
portion of their grouping to this sector. This shift also explains the sudden Ukrainian
gains near Malaya Loknya, which had long been the focal point of Russian efforts. Now, the focus
clearly moves to Sverdlikovo. On February 10th, Russians further drive a wedge in Ukrainian
positions there, forcing Ukrainians to respond by redeploying the elite “Tymura” Special Unit
of Defense Intelligence. This allows to slow down the advance, but heavy combat right in the
key village continues as of February 13th. Worth mentioning that losses of previous months of
mechanized assaults significantly affected the Russian equipment stockpiles. Now, they
switch to small infantry groups, as reserves of armored vehicles perished during the fall
campaign. The exceptions, however, also happen. On February 16th, the 155th Marine Brigade
launches the largest assault in months, attacking Ukrainian positions in Nikolskiy with
a mechanized column. This time, Russians actually arrange vehicles in proper order as the column
is headed by T-80BVM with additional armor, mine plow, and a bright Soviet flag on top. Four
BTRs closely follow the tank, this way avoiding landmines. While still moving through a gray zone,
the column is attacked by artillery and FPVs of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, and due to a lack of
jamming, one BTR-82 is immobilized. The Russian troops inside disembark and start running across
the flat field towards Ukrainian positions. Soon, another BTR is taken out this way, once again
forcing the infantry to attack by foot. Same fate awaits another BTR that closely
followed the tank. The Russian T-80BVM, being the most armored vehicle out of all almost
reaches Nikolskiy, detonating a number of mines, but after multiple FPV hits, finally comes
to a halt. One of the surviving crew members leaves the tank, likely wounded, but another FPV
drone ends his suffering. Ukrainians also execute a few extra strikes on the tank to make sure
it is completely destroyed and switch back to one lucky BTR that started retreating after
the first losses were taken by the column. Soon, it is located by FPVs and also burned down.
As much as this assault is typical for Russians, there are a few small observations that are worth
mentioning. First of all, the return of North Koreans was likely the reason why the Soviet
flag was used. As Russians, unlike Ukrainians, do not use any digital battlefield systems, they
have to rely on visual symbols to differentiate friend from foe. Before, these were large “Z”,
“V”, and “O” letters. However, the only easy symbol that both, they and North Koreans know
well is the Soviet flag; thus, the decision to use it on the first vehicle of the column. Judging
from astonishingly terrible operation planning, which yet is not surprising after all that we saw
in this series, we can conclude that the command of the 155th Marine Brigade is simply unable to
learn from their mistakes. Replenished with men and vehicles after disastrous defeats, they repeat
the assaults in the exact same way that inflicts maximum casualties. Even the fact that Sergei
Yefremov, Vice-Governor of Russia’s Primorsky Krai region and commander of the Tiger battalion
of the Brigade, was killed on February 2nd did not force them to rethink the approach.
Unlike near Malaya Loknya, around Sverdlikovo, Russian VDV forces
continue methodically expanding the wedge, reaching the border here by February 20th.
The attempts to cross it however, are stopped by timely redeployed 78th Air Assault Regiment.
By February 22nd, Russians also push Ukrainians out of recently captured Fanaseevka. Since the
capture of Sverdlikovo separated a small part of the salient to the west of Sudzha, by February
24th, Ukrainians start a slow retreat to the border there despite concentrating Marines as
well as rangers to mitigate further advances. The defense here crumbles as Russians also intensify
assaults in the northern part as well as in the area of Kurilovka. That way, by February
25th, Ukrainians further lose Pogrebki and most importantly, positions around Sverdlikovo.
By the end of the month, they retreat to the border in a separated portion of the salient since
it is way more reinforced and easier to defend. Full withdrawal of the 21st Mechanized and 3 more
brigades was another reason for that. Overall, Russian successes are explained by the fact that
they suddenly shifted focus to a less reinforced part of the frontline, namely Sverdlikovo,
instead of burning hundreds of vehicles in assaults near Malaya Loknya and started actively
targeting Ukrainian logistics. The latter became relevant only when the Russian extremely bloody
assaults allowed to reduce width of the salient to approximately 20 kilometers, which means that
any logistical vehicles in it can reliably be destroyed with regular FPVs. This is why positions
to the north crumble too as Ukrainian troops in Malaya Loknya are mostly supplied and rotated
out of combat through a single key road that is currently under constant drone surveillance
and strikes. We already mentioned similar issues with Sudzha, but there, Ukrainians at least
have urban buildings to hide vehicles, while the western part of the salient consists mostly
of villages completely leveled down by aviation. On March 2nd, Russians continue to pressure the
Ukrainian western flank as every new kilometer of advance exposes more and more already vulnerable
supply lines to constant drone strikes. It is also worth mentioning that Russians gradually
accumulated all their best FPV drone teams, such as Hateful Eight, Sudoplatov’s
Battalion, Kaskad, Bobr, and Rubikon here, withdrawing them from other parts of the
frontline. If in 2024, strikes on Ukrainian logistics in Kursk were irregular and most of
the key roads were simply out of drone reach, now the situation has drastically changed. Since
the end of January, Russian multi-frequency and fiber-optic FPVs, as well as various winged strike
drones, make constant ambushes on supply vehicles and effectively control all the roads in Kursk and
partially Sumy regions. Essentially, Ukrainians now use the only supply line through Sudzha,
which Russians quickly turn into road of death for logistical vehicles. Ukrainians try to mimic
the Russian anti-drone measures by turning key supply routes into corridors protected by nets,
but it’s quite late. The mud that comes together with wormer weather only makes situation worse.
By March 5th, Russians also cross the Psel river in the area of Kurilovka, further continuing
efforts to encircle the Ukrainian grouping with paralyzed logistics. Worth mentioning that all
these events coincide with the US Administration blocking deliveries of already ordered aid to
Ukraine to pressure it into negotiations. So, around this time, the Ukrainian command likely
makes a final decision to completely retreat from the Kursk region. Such an operation
in given circumstances is one of the most fundamental challenges for the Ukrainian command
and personally, Oleksandr Syrskyi, the author of Kursk Incursion. After stabilizing Pokrovsk, he
again has to jump in to micromanage the area after fairly disastrous month for Ukrainians there.
The last such retreat was executed near Avdiivka, where it was necessary to redeploy the whole
3rd Assault Brigade to the crumbling flanks to hold them. Now, the situation is less
critical than there, but the Russian command already has a plan to make it such.
Once again, mimicking what happened in Avdiivka a year ago, Russians decide to use
underground pipe to infiltrate behind Ukrainian lines. This time, instead of a sewer, they use the
pipes used to transport Natural Gas. The mission, named Operation “Pipe” or “Stream”, however,
is set up for failure from the very beginning. First of all, Russian volunteers in the Kursk
region started looking for diving equipment and oxygen cylinders before the operation started,
which was noticed by the Ukrainian command. Sections of the pipe are also apparently filled
with various condensates and tar, which makes breathing in them highly dangerous. Nevertheless,
the Russian command, expecting to repeat the limited success of such an operation in Avdiivka,
send over 100 men through the pipe in the first wave towards Ukrainian positions 15 kilometers
away. The underground assault force is made from soldiers of the 30th Motor Rifle Regiment,
11th Air Assault, Veterany, and Vostok Brigades, as well as the Akhmat Special Forces Regiment.
On March 8th, the first Russians crawl out of the pipe to the north of Sudzha, expecting that
they are already behind Ukrainian lines. However, they find no Ukrainians who left that area
earlier. Suddenly, they are hit by heavy artillery fire. Under a combination of regular
and cluster artillery shells, troops cannot advance into Sudzha and retreat to the abandoned
village of Kubatkin. Out of 800 men in total, not all of them survive though, as many choke to
death or simply receive heavy poisoning with pipe tar. Judging from the videos, only a few soldiers
have protective equipment, so it is not a surprise that in a few months, the reports will surface
that operation survivors are usually not making it out in hospitals. Approximately a company of pipe
infiltrators were also wiped out by artillery. The dangerous advance toward the
border from Kurilovka further signals that Ukrainian forces are retreating in the
area south of Sudzha. Yet, the rear guard, formed from elements of the 33rd and 225th Assault
Regiments, along with the 253rd Assault Battalion, inflict heavy losses on North Korean units there,
halting their push toward the border. Similarly, Russian attempts to advance in area of Zhuravka
also fail. Yet, the border there is crossed, which clearly shows that Russians desperately
try to encircle what was left of the garrison. Despite mounting pressure on the flanks, strained
logistics, and infiltration through pipe, the Ukrainian withdrawal continues
as planned. It is worth emphasizing, however, that relentless Russian drone pressure
remains the primary challenge and complicating factor throughout the process. At the same time,
operation “Pipe” simply cannot have any meaningful impact as there is no footage of Ukrainian
troops even engaging Russian infiltrators. Thus, the positions there were likely abandoned long
time ago as troops focus on holding Sudzha. In public perception, however, the Russian
narrative once again reversed the importance of pipe assault and drone pressure, turning a
clearly suicidal mission into a tale of heroism. Meanwhile, Russians reclaim many positions
in the northern part of the salient, which are already abandoned for some time.
Since the roads remain extremely dangerous, most of the Ukrainian armored vehicles were
evacuated earlier, while troops in many places have to retreat on foot. This, unlike assaults
of foot, in some cases might even be safer, especially as Ukrainian infantry tries to move at
night and along the forests and treelines. At this point, any vehicles that try to cross the border
are burnt down in minutes, day or night. But, what footage does not show is any major engagements,
meaning Ukrainian retreat proceeds as planned. By March 10th, most of the grouping is evacuated
and takes new positions in the Sumy region, while Russians continue to advance through
abandoned settlements. The claims of the Russian command and Putin himself about thousands
of captured Ukrainian soldiers as usual, are not backed up by any evidence, as Russians
can hardly demonstrate even a dozen Ukrainian prisoners of war. Eventually, by March 16th, they
recapture Sudzha and take a solid foothold behind the border, in the area of Novenke, while also
facing resistance near Guyevo. The river crossings here are actively bombarded by Ukrainian
aviation, and vehicles are hit by drones, so they cannot quickly reclaim this land.
Overall, by the end of the month, battles continue around Oleshnya and Guyevo, which remain the
last Ukrainian positions in place of the initial salient. Various cross-border raids are also
launched by both sides with the goal of tying down the forces of each other. By the end of April,
Russians mostly push their adversary from the last two villages held, declaring on April 26th that
the whole area of the Kursk region is liberated. In reality, Ukrainians continue to control
positions along the border as well as attack in places like Demidovka. Russians also soon push
into the Sumy region with their grouping. However, they reach only tactical gains, capturing a few
destroyed border villages and stopping, just as in the course of their 2024 Kharkiv Offensive,
about which we also made a separate video. So, at this point, we can draw final conclusions
from the Kursk Incursion and try answering the question of whether the operation was successful
or not. First, let’s start with the idea behind it and a set of likely goals. As discussed
earlier, the Ukrainian original grouping numbered at most about 15,000 men and struck
in multiple directions. That distribution of forces makes it unlikely there was any plan
to seize deep Russian territory—Kursk, Lgov, or the Kursk Nuclear Power Plant. Claims that
those were the true objectives lack supporting evidence. From everything we discussed, the
most logical list of goals Oleksandr Syrskiy likely had in mind during planning is as
follows. First, Ukrainian forces had to cross both Russian defensive lines—the border
line and the main line about 15 km inland—and secure key high ground and towns such as Sudzha
and Korenevo. The attack had to be shocking, not only to Russian public and command, but also
to Ukraine’s allies. A dramatic operation would expose Russian weakness in defending its territory
and its declared red lines. That, in turn, could push allies to increase support for Ukraine—above
all by greenlighting the use of Western long-range missiles against targets on Russian soil.
Second, a large number of surrendered Russian soldiers could be used in prisoner exchanges. That
would put Russia under pressure to negotiate. In that scenario, Ukraine, riding the momentum of
success, could present a set of demands together with all its allies and, in particular, the
incoming U.S. administration, regardless of the election outcome. Those demands would likely
center on a ceasefire and a major land swap: Russians receive Kursk back in exchange for
occupied parts of Ukraine. If Russians agree, Ukraine gets extra time to rework its
problematic command and control structure, as well as give some rest to the Armed Forces and
improve fortification everywhere. If they decline, they will be blamed for sabotaging negotiations
in front of the whole world and will have to waste a huge number of resources and troops
to first annihilate and then retake own land, instead of advancing on Donbas.
If we step away from speculation about political goals and return to the
battlefield, the Kursk Offensive also had to serve another purpose. It was designed to force
the Russians to move reserves from the east to the north. This would slow their territorial gains
and give Ukrainian troops a temporary window to strengthen fortifications and replenish
their ranks in the region. At the same time, the offensive had to boost morale. After all,
in two and a half years of fighting on Ukrainian soil, the war had finally been brought back into
Russia. President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskiy, also claimed that the Kursk Incursion was a
preemptive strike against a Russian grouping that planned to advance on Sumy. However, the evidence
in the form of units we saw on the Russian border prior to the Ukrainian attack clearly indicates
that this is not true. More plausible additional version voiced by Zelenskiy as well is that
Russians also planned an advance on Zaporizhzhia but canceled it due to the Kursk Incursion.
In any case, these were likely just formal justifications, and the real goals of operation
likely aligned more with those listed above. Now, let’s asses whether these goals were
reached. Politically, the Kursk Incursion was yet another major humiliation for Russia and
proof that Ukraine is still capable of advancing. This notion effectively lifted restrictions
on using most of Western long-range missiles, as well as all other kinds of equipment, on
Russian soil. In the process of Incursion, Ukrainians successfully used the element of
surprise to advance fast and deep, especially compared with praised by many recent Russian
successes in Donbas. After that, the attack force took a number of solid positions like Sudzha, but
the failure to capture Korenevo was detrimental to the grouping in the long term. Exactly from
Korenevo, Russians were launching the majority of their successful counterattacks and unblocked
the land corridor to Glushkovo, which was also on the verge of collapse at some point. This misstep
emerged mostly from the lack of forces in the very beginning, but this could also be attributed
to the mistakes during the planning phase. Politically, the fact that Ukrainians controlled
a large section of Russian territory was one of their strongest cards at the negotiating table.
However, the United States’ decision to begin piece talks with Russia semi-independently, rather
than in full coordination with Ukraine and Europe, essentially threw that bargaining chip
away. Ukrainians, however, had to face the repercussions of this decision, holding off
under attacks with rapidly declining US military aid and eventually, leaving the region.
In terms of diversionary value, however, the Kursk Operation had undeniable impact. Russia
redeployed significant forces to the area. More than half of all its Marine and VDV formations
took part in the bloody assaults there instead of fighting in Donbas. This included two full VDV
divisions, two VDV brigades, two Marine brigades, and one Marine regiment. They were supported by
over ten other brigades, as well as between 12,000 and 15,000 North Koreans, backed by more than a
dozen separate motor rifle regiments and Russia’s most advanced drone units. All of this, equipped
with the best available technology, from armored vehicles to cutting-edge fiber-optic drones,
was diverted specifically to Kursk. Against them, the Ukrainians held out for seven months
with only about ten mechanized brigades, one and a half tank brigades, three and a half Air Assault
brigades, four separate assault regiments, roughly a dozen Territorial Defense battalions, one
Marine brigade, and elements of Special Operations Forces. If these units had been sent to Donbas,
they would have been only a drop in the ocean amid massive groupings and forced into costly
attritional fighting. In Kursk, however, they for the first months, created a maneuver battlefield
where Ukrainians consistently outperformed the Russians, yielding far greater value.
Specifically the beginning of the operation itself deserves a place in military strategy books.
Ukrainians managed to covertly concentrate a small but sharp blitzkrieg force in an era of complete
drone domination, something deemed impossible. Most importantly, they defeated and captured the
bulk of the initial Russian grouping that held the border, an achievement often overlooked in the
shadow of the eventual retreat. That retreat, however, was anything but a rout. It
was carried out in an organized manner, as evidenced by the fact that Russians failed to
achieve even a minor encirclement or capture more than a handful of Ukrainian troops. Instead, the
same rugged Ukrainian grouping reemerged in the Sumy region, where it inflicted staggering losses
on Russian forces. Despite throwing in immense manpower and equipment, the Russians not only
failed to destroy the Ukrainian units but also fell far short of their next objective, never
coming close to threatening the city of Sumy, just 30 kilometers away from the border.
The Kursk Offensive, as a diversion, did not completely halt the Russian advance in
the southern part of Donetsk region. However, in the long term, it significantly slowed
Russian gains, particularly around Pokrovsk, where Ukrainian forces even managed to launch
several counterattacks, demonstrating that the city, whose fall had once seemed inevitable, was
far from lost. Russian manpower losses during the Kursk incursion were staggering. Due to the
nature of their repeated frontal assaults, and especially when factoring in the heavy
casualties suffered by North Korean units, they were at least several times higher than
Ukrainian ones. For over six months, Russians were on the constant, mostly poorly planned offensive,
reclaiming what Ukraine captured in less than a month. Yet, Ukrainians paid for initial speed
and eventual withdrawal with high vehicle losses, most of them inflicted by drones, during
resupply and rotations, not even assaults. In this video we already touched on fiber-optic
FPVs, and without diving deeper here it’s also worth underscoring the quality of Russian drone
operators. The aforementioned Rubicon — formally the Center for Advanced Unmanned Technologies
“Rubicon” — is far more than a single drone unit. Well-financed and secretive, it links
drone manufacturers, UAV training centers, and frontline drone detachments into a single,
efficient network. This systemic approach to drone warfare is arguably the most significant Russian
military development of 2024. Since late February, Rubicon operators, thanks to their skills
and cutting-edge equipment, have effectively annihilated the logistics of the Ukrainian Kursk
grouping in less than a month, inflicting a large share of the losses we will discuss further.
Between August 6th, 2024, and March 24th, 2025, Ukrainians lost 790 pieces of equipment
according to the footage while Russians, 740 in the Kursk and Sumy regions. The ratio 1 to
1 in losses is considered unfavorable for Ukraine, which has both fewer vehicles in storage as
well as lower capacity to produce them. However, this analysis is usually based on quite outdated
data and is superficial. As of Spring 2025, Russia mostly depleted its vast storage
bases and uses way less equipment of all types than in the beginning of the war. So,
since using less translates to losing less, it makes sense that Russian losses are roughly
equal to Ukrainian. The composition is also important. For Ukrainians, the three largest
loss categories are Infantry Mobility Vehicles, Infantry Fighting Vehicles, and tanks, 41, 34, and
9 percent, respectively. For Russians, these are Armored Fighting Vehicles, Tanks, and Transport
vehicles, 58, 11, and 11 percent, respectively. The Infantry mobility vehicles correspond to
only 9% of losses compared to 41% losses for Ukrainians. All this shows us interesting dynamics
that Ukrainians lost more in absolute numbers, but 41% of losses are basically armored tactical
cars, such as HMWEEs or MRAPs, such as MaxxPros. Both types are quite easily replaceable, not
only with Western aid that over the years provided literally thousands of them, but also
by domestic production. Unlike tanks or AFVs, these do not require complex running gear, a fire
control system, and a gun with stabilization, which also makes them quite cheap. The real
problem for Ukraine is that the third of losses were more rare and often western IFVs such as
Strykers, Bradleys, Marders, and CV-90s. However, in this specific category Russians’ way surpassed
their adversaries, due to absolutely atrocious assaults that filled the roads of the Kursk region
with hundreds of hulls of BTRs and BMPs. So, Ukrainian losses were high, but if we take into
account their composition as well as achieved impact and most importantly the lives vehicles
saved when it comes to the cases of using western tanks and IFVs, we can conclude that they are not
nearly as catastrophic and do not significantly affect the Ukrainian capabilities in the long run.
Further battles, where Ukrainians continue to rely on mechanized assets only prove this. Russians,
at the same time, used up mostly irreplaceable even in long run vehicles out of carefully
accumulated reserves, likely prepared for the Pokrovsk direction. This is evident from the fact
that while in Kursk and Pokrovsk, assaults were conducted with new T-80s, T-90s, and BMP-3s, in
other directions, Russian troops were literally using motorbikes, scooters, and civilian cars for
head-on assaults. The Russian force that pushed in Sumy region in Spring 2025, was almost exclusively
infantry. Thus, we have to reiterate that without the Kursk Incursion, the Russian command would be
more rational with how they use remaining armored vehicles, but Kremlin orders likely gave Aleksandr
Lapin, grouping commander, a full access to strategic vehicle reserves once the decision was
made to eject Ukrainians from the region as soon as possible. All this resulted that Russians were
forced to exchange their scarce IFVs for mostly adversary’s replaceable IMVs at a 1 to 1 ratio.
It also applies to the bigger picture as instead of fighting in Donbas, tens of thousands of
Russians were forced to fight inside Russia for 7 months. Instead of dropping hundreds of UMPK
glide bombs on Ukrainian settlements, these were dropped en masse on Russian ones, pretty much
destroying all inhabited areas on the border. Instead of Ukrainian civilians losing homes, over
140 thousand Russian civilians were displaced, with many losing everything they had and further
putting a strain on already strained economy. And in the end, all Russians did in their campaign
is pretty much restored control over ruins, gaining virtually nothing compared to August 2024.
The aftermath of the operation, similar to other outcomes we mentioned, is also a topic of heated
debates. Russians got a solid excuse to invade the Sumy region, but their grouping, after suffering
staggering losses and immediately stripped off most of armor quickly bogged down. Especially,
since they failed to perform even the smallest tactical encirclement, allowing the Ukrainian
grouping to conduct a successful retreat from the Kursk region. In Sumy, it is also harder
to cut off Ukrainian logistics due to more forest and Ukrainians no longer fighting in narrow
salient. Their next goal was likely in line with the official one, creating a buffer zone. However,
this goal leads only to further mass casualties, similar to the area north of Kharkiv. There,
Russians were more proactive and attacked first in May 2024, just to hit a brick wall of
Ukrainian defenses around 10 kilometers from the border and failing to move even an inch
forward beyond this barrier for over a year, continuing to suffer constant losses.
In conclusion, the Ukrainian Kursk Incursion was an ingenious operation by initial
design, proving that Ukraine, against all odds, can regain the initiative and advance, thanks
to its Commander-in-Chief, Oleksandr Syrskyi. However, political circumstances beyond Ukraine’s
control, along with the limited forces available, significantly influenced how the operation
unfolded. The Ukrainian retreat cannot be taken as a sole indicator of failure, since Ukraine never
aimed to annex enemy territory, unlike Russia. Yet heavy losses and the eventual collapse
of logistics, which forced the withdrawal, suggest that concluding the operation earlier
might have been a better course of action. These, of course, remain speculations with the
benefit of hindsight. In our assessment, the Kursk Offensive deserves to be called costly
and modest, but still a success, a true case of “squeezing water out of a rock,” and the very
first blitzkrieg style offensive of the drone era.
The Kursk Offensive of 2024 stands out as one of the most unexpected and daring moves of the entire Russo-Ukrainian War. After months of defensive operations, Ukraine launched a cross-border offensive into Russia’s Kursk region, pushing deep into enemy territory, capturing dozens of settlements, and securing a significant stretch of land. In a matter of days, Ukrainian forces advanced approximately 1,000 square kilometers inside Russian territory — a figure that eclipsed Russia’s gains in both the Kharkiv sector and Donbas during the same period.
This operation demonstrated that rapid maneuver warfare, once thought obsolete in the modern drone-dominated battlefield, was still possible with the right combination of lessons learned, operational secrecy, logistics, demining, and carefully chosen axes of advance.
In hindsight, the Kursk Offensive delivered more than just territorial gains. It boosted Ukrainian morale, highlighted Russia’s defensive weaknesses, and helped accelerate international support for longer-range strikes inside Russia. Today, this operation is remembered as a pivotal moment that reshaped the course of the border war and demonstrated how modern tactics and classic maneuver warfare could still work side by side.
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47件のコメント
Totally not bias guys, only show russian loses, and guess who lost kursk and lead to the whole down fall of the donsket front
All NATO efforts fucked up by Russia, skill & strategy issue. Even with this offensive Russia didnt stop to move forward on the other parts of the frontline, what a mess but nice try. Ukraine have a lot of warriors.
in every one of your videos your conclusion is always the same Ukraine= minimal losses, maximum gains Russia= extreme losses and every gain costs so much manpower, that it basically becomes a defeat. This is the same rethoric, that every losing side is using to keep moral up, in Germany for example our propaganda radio show " Die Wochenschau" kept telling about the sure victory of the axis, as shells rained down on Berlin. If this operation was such a success why the hell dont they repeat it, since ukr showed, that they are easily able to and deal a massive blow to the enemy. This channel is nothing but pure propaganda you are a mouthpiece for Kiew that is all.
Kursk Su1c1de – Full Documentary.
This man forgot about the ukranian losses. Ukraine lost 34k soilders from 2024-25 while russia lost 17k lsoilders. These aren't only for just kursk but for the whole front. And I think this guy forgot to state that the ukranians lost a lot of armoured vehicles but overall in kursk the russian and ukranian losses are quite the same.
Lots of Russian fan girls in the comments. Like there literally footage of what true , and what’s over exaggerate in those reports. cant just pick and choose what you think will fit your agenda
This Propaganda offensive for a few Russian villages cost UA every Second vehicle and they we're at the end, beaten by 350 Russian Soldiers through a Pipe…
After that the UA learned painly that the Russians developed a Fiberoptic non jammable Drone..
And today the Russians are in Front of Sumy.
Perfect Kursk offensive like the Germans in 1943.
ZOV
Yeah Ukraine successfully lost in the Kursk.Now they will go for Moscow 😢
What a complete waste and fiasco of an operation, which only served to prove everything the critics of this war have been saying about its origin. It's a NATO proxy war where Ukraine provides the dead and the blood of its people.
This stupid offensive proved that the high command doesn't make strategic military decisions; they only make decisions that serve as propaganda to keep the flow of taxpayer money coming for military aid packages. It's about having favorable narratives to justify continuing to praise a totalitarian and military government for pursuing a war that was lost before it even began.
Russia trampled them in Kursk, and meanwhile, what about the Donbas? Although, it wouldn't have mattered much if the brigades sent to Kursk had gone to the Donbas instead, since Russia was already wearing down all the Ukrainian lines to advance on Pokrovsk.
So much human suffering and pain for the people, all while the same old crowd gets richer than ever. On one side, you have the American arms lobby, and on the other, the Russian military-industrial complex.
1:53:45 "Retreating by foot might be even safer"
What in the actual hell are you smoking man? It wasn't safer at all
what a stupid offensive. Similar to ardenes offensive only a fanatic would call that a success.
2 hours of video highlighting nato’s desperate attempt to hide their own losses and the consequences of this offensive on the Ukrainian losses.
Ukraine got whooped. Thats why they're not in Kursk anymore
Don't forget majority of soldiers in kursk invasion weren't ukranians but nato boots
The Kursk incursion, along with the 2023 summer counter-offensive, were some of the biggest mistakes Ukraine has made to date.
trying to steal content, but doing it successfully
Если у ВС РФ мало украинских пленных тогда почему все последние обмены военнопленными происходили в формате 10 бойцов ВСРФ на 1000 бойцов ВСУ лол? ахахахаххаах
So much, b.s in this documentary, the kursk adventure was a disaster for Ukraine. If you believe this b.s this guy wasted all this time making a documentary, about a war I follow like a religion, it's like trying to change history whilst it's being made.
The human losses for Ukraine were also catastrophic, I saw the videos where entire Ukrainian groupings north of sudhza were not allowed to surrender or retreat, kilometres of strewn with soldier, and when the prisoner exchange came the ratios were 1000 ukr to 200 RüS.
Like American Story.😂😊 "Ukraine win the Battle but Lost the War"..good for Bed Time Story..wakakkakakkaka😅
Viewers : How many Weed do you smoked ?
This channel : YESSSSSSSSSSSS
😂😂😂😂😂
Damm the russian bots are active today
More PR for Ukraine as always,this war was the last nail on the coffin for the western medias credibility and the gaza genocide the last one for the so called human values of the west.
What nonsense is this video about 😂😂 but reality speaks differently 😂😂
Russian brothers, continue to destroy the neo-Nazis.
i need to know your plug because this is next copium level 😭
Dude, change the channel name to Ukrainian propaganda. The passage through the pipe was successful. But the Ukrainians claimed that everyone was killed and showed a strike somewhere, so why shouldn't we believe them? Stories about an organized retreat. Is the infantry's flight across the fields an organized retreat?
Calling this an Offensive is quite generous.
Those fool guys attacked Kursk and gain nothing
Dude showed a footage of a russian BMP-3 getting blow up, but didn't showed a footage of a whole column of Ukrainian BTR and IFV getting smoked in the first days of offensive, a lot of Russian footage from Kursk just looks like that came from a movie, even Ukrainian footage too.
For Western history, the video has been released.
In short, ukraine conducted a brilliant offensive operation without suffering significant losses.
Not all of the operation's objectives were achieved, but this is a smaller part.
The operation was a disaster for the Russian side, with up to 250 assault troops killed without fulfilling their tasks.
Russia and Korea suffered significant losses during the offensive.
Ukraine successfully retreated without suffering any significant losses.
This is how this propaganda channel presents it.
Report this video as spam or misinformation
😂😂 ed alla fine sono tutti concime per le terre russe 😂😂🇷🇺💯💯🇷🇺
I get that he probably shouldn't of said that Ukraine didn't loose many in the retreat and such but damn the bots are having a field day in the comments lmao
Memberberies before another Ukrainian city fall to Russians.🥀🥀🥀
You lost me withthe "failed pipeline op" copium at the end.Historylegends did it better, sorry.
Wow. This is really bad. Surprised you left the comments open..
What a huge lie))
A biased narrative from start to finish. Especially as we get closer to the finale, it's complete nonsense.
I hope you don't commit s*uicide* out of deep sadness. ❤️🩹😢🤕
Because with every video you've made and will make, the Russians have won, are winning, and will continue to win.
Stunning and brave
🤣🤣🤣🤣🤣
Boring video before sleep
Nice bot of yukrainian propaganda
Холи шит, эти порки бьют как грузовик, потому что сделаны из чистого свинца
Well, this is awkward for the NAFO trolls who are eager to reply to this comment….. This video lies and I have video proof in my channel.
I have multiple videos of Russians getting out of the pipeline without taking fire.
I have multiple videos of Russians destroying an entire convoy live as the bridge was taken out.
I have videos of mass Ukraine dead soldiers (blurred the footage myself for YouTube).
So, yeah. This must be awkard for yall. Youre lying, I have proof. Unedited footage, no AI voiceover, no misleading thumbnail.
What now? Pro Russian troll? That doesnt change the fact that ukraine is losing and this is all a lie?
Whata next? "Bot" "Russian troll", notice the replies of these cowards that they deflect into 6 year olds when their arguments collapse….
propoganda channel NATO BOT
О чём вы тут спорите, у автора славянский акцент и очевидно что канал пропагандисткий проукраинский.